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THE STATE AND THE MARKET IN 1800: 
LORD KENYON AND 
MR WADDINGTON* 
I 
FREE MARKETS AND THE LAW 
 
In early 1801 the judges of the Court of King's Bench sentenced 
Samuel Ferrand Waddington to a fine of £1,000, four months' 
imprisonment, and continued imprisonment until his fine was 
paid, for criminal behaviour in the markets. An established 
London merchant who had lately entered the hop trade, he had 
been found guilty by a City of Worcester jury and by a Middlesex 
jury in King's Bench of the common-law offence of having 
engrossed hops and artificially raised the market price in 
Worcestershire and Kent. 1 Waddington spent a year in the courts, 
* Earlier versions of this paper were given to the conference on Formation of the 
Modern State, St Peter's College, Oxford, 14-16 April 1988; to the Colloque 
International sur les processus de criminalisation et de decriminalisation dans le monde 
occidental depuis le Moyen Age jusqu'a nos jours, Maison des Sciences de l'Homme, 
Paris, 20-2 October 1988; and to the International Conference on Moral Economy, 
University of Birmingham, 2 April 1992. My thanks to the participants in those 
conferences and to John Beattie, Harry Glasbeek,  Joanna Innes, the Rt Hon. Lord 
Kenyon DL, Jeanette Neeson, Ruth Paley, Adrian Randall, Nicholas Rogers, Paul 
Romney, the late Edward Thompson, Wendy Thwaites and others, for materials or 
comments on earlier drafts. Earl Stuart, Dan Condon, Evelyn Bogie and the librarians 
of Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, gave much assistance, and 
the research was done under grants by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research 
Council of Canada. 
1 The law reports give a fragmentary account. See Edward Hyde East, Reports of 
Cases Argued and Determined in the Court of King's Bench, 16 vols. (London, 1800-12), 
i, 143-66, 167-72 (hereafter  1 East  143, 167), repr. in  The English Reports, 178 vols. 
(London and Edinburgh, 1900-32), cii, 56-65, 65-68 (hereafter 102 ER 56, 65). 
Reported cases are cited hereafter by the standard abbreviation for the original report 
and the English Reports version, where one exists. There are three printed trials: A 
Summary of the Trial the King v. S. F. Waddington, for Purchasing Hops at Worcester 
with Notes by the Defendant (London, 1800), published by Waddington in November 
before the final judgement on the Worcester offence; Trial of an Information Filed by 
Order of the Court of King's Bench, against Samuel Ferrand Waddington at the Assizes 
for the City of Worcester for Engrossing Hops, and Other Misdemeanours Relating to the 
Hop-Trade (London, 1800); The Proceedings at Large in the Cause the King v. 
Waddington, for Purchasing Hops, in Kent: Also the Pleadings, &c. when the Defendant 
was Called Upon for Judgment upon the Verdict at Worcester (London, 1801). This last 
was probably also published by Waddington.  For a chronology of the cases and other 
( cunt. on p. 102,i 
  
and half a year in prison; the case ruined him. 2 He claimed 
throughout to have followed the accepted customs of the trade. 
The epigraph he gave to a published account of one of his trials 
was 'Perish Commerce!' 3 Many, perhaps most, members of the 
government and parliament agreed with him, and believed that 
he had committed no offence whatsoever: the statutory penalties 
against forestalling, regrating and engrossing had been repealed 
in 1772.4 The judges,  particularly Lord Kenyon, the Lord Chief 
Justice, were emphatically of the opposite view. They had worked 
hard to restate the offences at common law and were delighted 
with the outcome of the trials. 
Waddington's Cases, and the related prosecution of Rusby, were 
notorious at the time, and almost incredible to nineteenth-century 
commentators. Lord Campbell termed Kenyon's judgements an 
'absurd doctrine' about an 'imaginary crime'. 5 More recently it 
has been suggested that the cases not only contradicted govern- 
ment policy in 1800 and earlier, but also a current of legal doctrine 
in the later eighteenth century that increasingly reflected many 
of the principles of classical political economy. 6 After Kenyon's 
death in 1802 further prosecutions for marketing offences were 
quietly dropped; by 1816 the treatise writers declared that the 
law, so loudly proclaimed by the judges and so dramatically 
enforced at the expense of Mr Waddington, was dead. 
In retrospect these cases appeared anomalous, but at the time 
they expressed an unresolved tension in law and policy. Lord 
Kertyon, who was Chief Justice of King's Bench from 1788 until 
 
(n. 1 conr.; 
related ones referred to below, and the sources in the records of King's Bench, see 
Appendix. Samuel Ferrand Waddington should not be confused with Samuel 
Waddington, 'little Waddy', radical printer and shoemaker: see Iain McCalman, 
Radical Underworld: Prophets, Revolutionaries and Pornographers in London, 1795-1840 
(London, 1988), 269, passim. 
2 He retained Edward Law (whose fees were very high since his successful defence 
of Warren Hastings) backed by seven other counsel; Law became Attorney General 
three days after Waddington was sentenced. The prosecution in both cases was led 
by Thomas Erskine, probably the most expensive barrister in England, backed by 
another phalanx of juniors: see Dictionary of National Biography; Proceedings in the 
Cause the King v. Waddington, 25. 
3 Proceedings in the Cause the King v. Waddington, title page. 
4 12 Geo. III, c. 71. 
5 John, Lord Campbell, Lives of the Chief Justices, 3 vols. (1857; repr. London, 
1971), iii, 138. 
6 Roger Wells, Wretched Faces: Famine in Wartime England, 1793-1801 (Gloucester, 
1988); also his Insurrection: The British Experience, 1795-1803 (Gloucester, 1983); 
Patrick Atiyah, The Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract (Oxford, 1979). 
  
1802, and at the time of the case was near the end of his long 
legal career, was idiosyncratic in some of his enthusiasms, but his 
view of the marketing offences was shared by most of the other 
eleven common-law judges in 1801.7 Moreover, all standard legal 
works throughout the eighteenth century emphasized that fore- 
stalling, regrating and engrossing were offences at common law, 
even after the 1772 repeal. The judges' endorsement of that view 
in 1801, followed by their repudiation of the doctrine within a 
few years, was an important transition in public policy, with large 
consequences. 8 The marketing cases, when examined closely, also 
raise important questions about the place of the courts in the 
anatomy of the state, and cast some light on the nature of contract 
law in the late eighteenth century. 
To inquire about the nature of a judiciary that is guaranteed 
independence from royal disfavour at the beginning of the eight- 
eenth century is to pose the question of the 'relative autonomy' 
of law in a particular form. Not for the first time, but under new 
conditions after the Act of Settlement (1701), we see the possibil- 
ity of a judicial politics independent of, or indeed opposed to, 
government policy, legislative intent or economic interest. Before 
Waddington there was Lord Camden's role in the cases involving 
Wilkes, when as Chief Justice of Common Pleas he opposed, in 
almost every instance, the decisions and politics of Lord 
Mansfield, who at the time sat both as Chief Justice of King's 
Bench and in the cabinet. 9 In the nineteenth century we can cite 
the long series of cases in which judicial ingenuity was constantly 
exercised to block the willingness of Parliament to enact legisla- 
tion designed to protect trade unions from the hostility of courts. 10 
In such cases of judicial politics we need to know where 'opposi- 
tional' judges get their politics and projects, how they justify 
their behaviour and how they manage to shape legal doctrine 
 
7 Sydney Smith wrote in his old age: 'I remember when ten judges out of twelve 
laid down this doctrine in their charges to the various grand juries on their circuits', 
quoted in Campbell, Lives of the Chief Justices, iii, 80. At Rusby's trial, Kenyon stated 
that all the judges had charged their juries that the common-law offences still stood: 
Times, 5 July 1800. 
8 Such an explanation is needed not only for the evidently anomalous case; all 
significant developments of doctrine, however linear, are accomplished only in 
specific cases. 
9 Douglas  Hay, 'Contempt by Scandalizing the Court: A Political History of the 
First Hundred Years', Osgoode Hall Law JI, xxv (Fall 1987). 
10 The most recent account is John Orth, Combination and Conspiracy: A Legal 
History  of  Trade  Unionism, 1721-1906  (Oxford,  1991). 
  
(sometimes surprisingly quickly) to such ends. We also need to 
ask how the interests of government are affected, how it responds 
and what are the consequences for accounts privileging a notion 
of 'the state' closely identified with 'law'. Finally, we need to 
examine the detailed evidence, in specific decisions such as these 
cases, of the relations judges have with government, party and 
wider publics. We can then say more exactly what we mean by 
the notion of an independent judiciary,  and by 'rule of law'. 11 
The marketing cases have also figured in a debate of the last 
twenty years concerning the nature of  contract doctrine  at the 
end of the eighteenth century and the place within it of classi- 
cal political economy. Patrick Atiyah cited these cases as two 
instances of what he argued was a weakened but still extant 
tradition in the courts of interfering in some contractual matters 
in the interests of public policy, interference of a kind that became 
anathema to nineteenth-century judges, who by then were pur- 
posive facilitators of the market, some more overtly than others. 
Two questions are central. One is whether the eighteenth-century 
judges were willing, in some instances, to refuse to enforce agree- 
ments, particularly contracts for future performance,  solely  on 
the grounds that ab initio or through passage of time they were 
seriously disadvantageous to the public interest, or to one party 
in a way harmful to that interest. 12 The second point at issue is 
the extent to which such judicial practices, if they existed, were 
part of a world-view innocent of, or suspicious of, political econ- 
omy, and were eventually ended by doctrinal changes inspired in 
significant measure by political economy. 13 
Atiyah's argument has been debated with evidence and argu- 
 
11 An assessment of how the bench viewed political economy, or the relationship 
of judicial to wider political power, cannot be based on a few cases. I am working on 
a general argument for the period between the mid-eighteenth and the mid-nineteenth 
centuries, based on an examination of a variety of cases in public and private law, 
The Judges and the People: King's Bench and the Criminal Law in English Politics and 
Society,  1750-1820  (forthcoming). 
12 The suggestion is that this took place in the common-law courts through the use 
of jury verdicts, but also some elements of doctrine,  and that similar views were 
expressed in decisions in Chancery and the equity side of Exchequer. 
13 The argument is a wide-ranging one, covering doctrines of promise and considera- 
tion, attitudes to quasi-contract (restitution), expectation damages, the likely behavi- 
our of juries and the elaboration of doctrines of mistake, unconscionability and 
reliance. Aliyah insists on the fact that he was describing tendencies in the law over 
about a century, not a sudden revolution. Aliyah, Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, 
passim. The marketing cases are considered at 363-6, where the citation of Rushy as 
'Ruby' copies a typographical  error in some reports. 
  
ments of varying worth and, given the wide ambit of contract 
law, differing conclusions have been drawn about its relevance 
to particular aspects of contract. 14 Waddington  and  Rushy, 
although criminal cases, are indeed relevant to an extent not 
evident in Atiyah's account. The detailed history of the litigation 
(rather than the laconic law reports) shows that classical political 
economy was actively debated in parliament, in the legal profes- 
sion and on the bench by 1800.15 The wide reporting of cases in 
Westminster Hall by this date, and the duration  of  litigation 
there, made the central courts extremely important fora of that 
debate. My conclusion is that the brief notoriety and swift repudi- 
ation of these cases brought a vulgarized notion of political econ- 
omy before the bench, and a much wider public, and helped to 
ensure its paramountcy in a few short decades. 16 
The continuing popular significance of the medieval and early 
14 There is now a wide literature on Atiyah's description of changes in contract law 
and the somewhat different account of a wider range of private law of  Morton 
Horwitz, The Transformation of American Law (London, 1977). A recent summary of 
the main points at issue is John Wightman, Contract: A Critical Commentary (London, 
1996), chs. 4, 5. See also Michael Lobban, The Common Law and English Jurisprudence, 
1760-1850 (Oxford,  1991), esp. ch. 9; on one important  doctrinal issue presented  as 
a test of Atiyah's argument, with much interesting evidence, Michael Lobban, 
'Contractual Fraud in Law and Equity, c.1750-1850', Oxford J I Legal Studies, xvii 
(1997). Here, I think  Lobban somewhat  oversimplifies  the debate about  change, or 
at least Atiyah's complex account of it, when he describes it as 'fairness or freedom 
of contract' whether 'a communitarian and paternalistic approach was replaced by an 
individualistic and entirely-market orientated ideology of  freedom  of  contract'.  His 
own reading of the case law (in part) is that concern with 'fairness' actually increased 
in the common-law courts in  the  early nineteenth century. The  argument  tends  to 
blur the fact that Atiyah described change largely as a contrast  between  1770 and 
1850; it is also confused by repeated references to Kenyon (who, indeed, was deeply 
concerned with fairness) as an exemplar of judicial attitudes of the early nineteenth 
century. Kenyon was an eighteenth-century judge in every sense of the word, includ- 
ing his dates (1732-1802). Many of his more adventurous attempts at fairness (not 
only the marketing cases) were repudiated  by his immediate successors. 
15 Which is not to say that the public debate was very learned; the struggle was for 
ideological conquest. Francis Horner in 1803 declined to publish a critique of Smith 
because the victory of political economy was not yet complete. 'We owe much at 
present to the superstitious worship of Smith's name . . . until we can give a correct 
and precise theory of the nature and origin of wealth, his popular and plausible and 
loose hypothesis is as good for the vulgar as any other', quoted in Biancamaria 
Fontana, Rethinking the Politics of Commercial Society: The Edinburgh Review, 1802- 
1832 (Cambridge, 1985), 47. 
16 Lobban in his critique of Atiyah argues against making 'too direct a link between 
changes in economic thought and changes in judicial behaviour' in this period. As 
evidence, he quotes John Stuart Mill (writing in 1825, at the age of nineteen)  to the 
effect that before  1818 political economy was 'scarcely known and talked of beyond 
a small circle of philosophers'. Lobban further suggests that even after 1815 'the 
economic policy  of the government  tended  to be pragmatic  rather  than  ideological' 
(cont. 011 p. 106) 
  
modern laws against forestalling, regrating and engrossing into 
the eighteenth century was recovered in E. P. Thompson's semi- 
nal article on the moral economy of the English crowd of 1971.17 
He showed the persistence of popular support for prosecutions 
against middlemen, and the willingness of government  at mid- 
century and many gentlemen and magistrates for decades after, 
to condemn middlemen for enhancing prices, and hence effective 
dearth, through the speculative practices stigmatized by the stat- 
ute and case law. The traditionalist view was, above all, a matter 
of law, a fact which must be emphasized because it has been 
largely ignored in most discussions of moral economy since 
Thompson wrote. The old statutes were repeatedly cited by 
magistrates in charges to juries in London and in the country 
throughout the first half of the century. Forestallers, it was said, 
'render the Poor less able to support their families' (Middlesex, 
1718). They were: 
Pernicious Sorts of People; who Plot and Conspire together to Advance 
unreasonably, or without any Real, Just Occasion the Price of Victuals, 
to the great Oppression, and Breeding of Murmuring and  Discontent, 
especially amongst the lower and meaner Sort of People. 
(Middlesex, 1725) 
They were held to enhance prices to the 'common Prejudice of 
all Buyers' (Barnsley, 1741), and the offenders were esteemed by 
law 'great Offenders' (Guildford, 1745). A charge repeatedly used 
in Norwich  in the early  1750s grouped the marketing  offences 
( n. 16 cunt.; 
and hence that 'if governments were not directly under the sway of economic theorists, 
there is no reason to believe that judges should have been, particularly if (like Eldon 
and Ellenborough), they were of High Tory persuasion'. See Lobban, 'Contractual 
Fraud in Law and Equity', 442 nn. 7-8. The nature of argument in the marketing 
cases suggests that all of these assertions (apart from the characterization of Eldon) 
are untenable for the first decades of the nineteenth century; the law reports are 
frequently misleading as to the nature of persuasive argument in court. 
17 E. P. Thompson, 'The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth 
Century', Past and Present, no. 50 (Feb. 1971). He recapitulated the argument with 
new evidence and a consideration of the ensuing debate, in 'The Moral Economy 
Reviewed', in his Customs in Common (London, 1991). There was truly ancient law 
on the matter: the Athenian constitution provided special officers of the state to detect 
and punish engrossers and those who made more than the legal profit on corn. The 
death penalty probably did not apply, but a member of the Athenian Council in a 
speech in 386 BC demanded punishment for men making such 'illicit gain': 'pity those 
of our citizens who perished by their villainy, and the traders against whom they 
have combined': 'Against the Corndealers', ch. 22, in Lysias, trans. W. R. M. Lamb 
(Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, Mass.,  1960); Aristotle,  The Athenian  Constitu- 
tion, s. 51 (trans. P. J. Rhodes,  Harmondsworth,  1984). I owe these  references to 
Virginia Hunter. 
  
with usury, monopoly, deceits and 'Cozinage in Weights and 
measures by which in a more particular manner the poor & needy 
are oppressd & mind for the emolument of some few of the most 
Worthless of Mankind'. In September 1767, the citizens of the 
city were again alerted from the bench to 'that cruel hardship on 
the poor Usury Forestalling  Monopoly & the like'. 18 
The analysis of the political economists, that a  wholly free 
market happily rationed supplies over the harvest year, seemed 
but abstract theory to traditionalists, contradicted by their own 
knowledge of the happy and opportunistic responses of millers 
and farmers to apprehended harvest failures. But the analysis of 
the advantages of market rationing, given classic form by Adam 
Smith in Book 4, Chapter 5 of The Wealth of Nations (1776), 
began to influence even country magistrates after the repeal of 
the statutes in 1772.19 
The correctness of each theory in hindsight -whether specu- 
lative withholding (or 'market rationing') was harmful or benefi- 
cial, or even how the corn market worked in practice - is not 
my concern here. 20 It is important, however, to emphasize that 
the dichotomy of moral economy and political economy proposed 
by Thompson was in fact an organizing principle of political and 
legal debates to the end of the century. It is not a crudely 
simplifying device that he imposed on the evidence. This last is 
the suggestion of Hont and Ignatieff, who argue that there were, 
by the 1770s, political-economy arguments for interfering as well 
as not interfering in markets in times of real crisis, and that 
'traditionalists' too were often simply taking a  position within 
political economy and were not, therefore, traditionalists in the 
simple sense  (they say) that  Thompson  makes  them. 21   Smith's 
18 These examples and others are reprinted in Charges to the Grand Jury, 1689-1803, 
ed. Georges Lamoine (Camden Soc., 4th ser., xxxxiii, London,  1992), 73, 105, 126, 
188, 203, 218, 235, 297, 313, 323, 360, 369, 373, 378, 382. 
19 Sir John Hawkins mentioned the offences briefly in a charge of January 1770; 
ten years later he ignored them. The Revd John Foley, a Gloucestershire paternalist, 
eloquently defended the wisdom of the market in a series of charges at the end of 
the century. Ibid., 425, 431, 583ff.; Adam Smith, 'Digression concerning the Corn 
Trade and Corn Laws', IV. v. b, in his An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the 
Wealth of Nations, ed. W. B. Todd, 2 vols.  (Oxford,  1976), i, 524-43. 
20 Some of the extensive comment on Thompson's article has concerned this issue, 
including the argument that markets are not efficient allocators in circumstances of 
real or apprehended famine. 
21 Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff, 'Needs and Justice in the Wealth of Nations: 
An Introductory Essay', in Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff (eds.),  Wealth  and 
Virtue: The Shaping of Political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge, 
1983), 15. 
  
commitment to a wholly unrestricted trade in corn, both internally 
and externally, is, they argue, atypical even among the best- 
known theorists of the free market by 1776, as a result of direct 
experience by such theorists with the felt suffering and problems 
for governments of shortages in both Europe and Britain in the 
1760s and early 1770s. Faced with starvation, they drew back 
from dogmatic certitude.22 (And even Smith, perhaps,  would 
have admitted government regulation in the face of absolute 
starvation. )23 
This is a useful elucidation of published political economy, but 
it captures only a narrow band of contemporary opinion. Even 
among educated men the traditionalist view very often arose from 
premises quite unrelated to any discussion of the rationality of 
self-regulating markets. Conversely, those supporting such theor- 
ies in England (notably Edmund Burke) had, by the 1770s and 
even more by the end of the century, no hesitation in drawing 
the fullest, un-nuanced, conclusions from Adam Smith. 
However, traditionalists and political economists were both 
acutely aware that the marketing offences were, after all, issues 
of law. A reading of their social significance, of their meaning 
and their rationales, therefore, was ultimately, and crucially, 
dependent on the views of the legislature and even more of the 
judges of the Court of King's Bench when they came to consider, 
alter or uphold the law. What follows is in large measure an 
attempt to reconstruct the mind of the bench in 1800. But it is 
helpful to look briefly at the preceding half-century. 24 
Kenyon was caricatured in 1800 as an old man who could not 
understand new ideas. In fact, he was voicing an important con- 
temporary strand of educated opinion. Those supporting criminal 
22 Ibid., 17-19. 
23 Smith did say that to hinder the freedom of the farmer seeking the best market 
was 'an act of legislative authority which ought to be exercised only, which can be 
pardoned only in cases of the most urgent necessity': Smith, Wealth of Nations, IV. 
v. b. 39 (ed. Todd, i, 539), cited by Hont and lgnatieff, 'Needs and Justice in the 
Wealth of Nations' , 20-1. They point out that a comparison with the position of Hume 
on dearth and markets suggests that by 'urgent necessity' Smith appears to mean only 
impending starvation. Smith also admitted the possible role of fraud in corn markets, 
as close readers pointed out: see Edmund Burke, Thoughts and Details on Scarcity, 
Originally Presented to the Right Hon. William Pitt, in the Month of November, 1795 
(London, 1800); also below, n. 98. 
24 The evidence and sources for the following three paragraphs appear in Douglas 
Hay, 'Moral Economy, Political Economy, and Law', in Adrian Randall and Andrew 
Charlesworth (eds.), The Moral Economy: Crowds, Conflict and Authority (London, 
1998), a few paragraphs of which also appear in this article. 
  
penalties for speculating in foodstuffs could cite the findings of 
parliamentary committees of 1764, 1766, 1768 and 1796 that one 
or more of the offences of forestalling, regrating and engrossing 
had recently and artificially enhanced prices to the detriment of 
the public. Parliament received petitions to this effect in most 
decades and bills for new penal legislation were attempted or 
actually brought before parliament in 1766, 1787 and 1797. An 
important source for some initiatives was the Common Council 
of London, largely reacting to the forestalling of its market of 
Smithfield. In part, their interest in legislation was initiated by 
retail butchers warring with wholesalers, but the recurrent con- 
troversy helped sustain support for all the old criminal law against 
market offenders, and city aldermen, as MPs, introduced  some 
of the bills for new legislation. 25 
On the other side were the supporters of Adam Smith. Smith's 
classic exposition of free markets in the corn trade was published 
in 1776, but the theoretical and practical case against the market- 
ing laws was effectively made before that date in public lectures, 
parliament and the courts. A 1767 attempt to repeal the statutes 
came to nothing, but Edmund Burke, who had  been involved, 
successfully achieved the passage in a few weeks' time in 1772 of 
an act that repealed all or part of six of the most important ones, 
and voided all current and future prosecutions on them.26 The 
explicit justification was that such prosecutions increased prices, 
distorted markets, harmed the poor and threatened to interfere 
with the supply of foodstuffs to London. Burke successfully 
opposed the 1787 attempt  to re-introduce criminal penalties by 
statute and was eloquent in condemning similar proposals in 1795 
to interfere with 'the laws of commerce, which are the laws of 
nature, and consequently the laws of God'.27  He lived just  long 
25 Susan Brown understates the importance of the dispute in the meat-trade contro- 
versy. She makes the suggestive point, however, that expectations of civic paternalism, 
protecting the poor from market excesses, were probably more effective in the 
intimate setting of the City than in the rest  of London.  Susan E.  Brown,  ' "A Just 
and Profitable Commerce": Moral Economy and the Middle Classes in Eighteenth- 
Century London', JI Brit.  Studies, xxxii  (1993). 
26 An Act for Repealing Several Laws therein M entioned against Badgers, Engrossers, 
Forestallers, and Regrators, and for Indemnifying Persons against Prosecutions for Offences 
Committed against the Said Acts: 12 Geo. III, c. 71 (1772). For the public presentation 
of Smith's ideas from the 1750s, see Ian Simpson Ross, The Life of Adam Smith 
(Oxford, 1995), 107-8; for David Hume's championing of free markets in corn in 
1758, see  TLS, 14 Aug.  1998. 
27 Hay, 'Moral Economy, Political Economy, and Law'; Burke, Thoughts and Details 
on  Scarcity, 32. 
 
 
 
 
  
enough to see the 1797 restoring bill (which horrified him) 
defeated. 
Burke's position was also that  of Lord Mansfield, the Chief 
Justice of King's Bench from 1756 to 1788, the judge who (with 
his three puisne justices) ultimately decided what was criminal in 
England. He may have been involved in planning the 1772 legisla- 
tion and, after its passage, apparently deterred any prosecutions 
in his court under the common law.28 Prosecutions at quarter 
sessions and assizes, which had been a recurrent if infrequent 
occurrence in most parts of the country before 1772, appear to 
have virtually ceased also at that time. But the exact state of the 
law was uncertain. Did the offences still exist at common law, in 
spite of the repeal of some of the statutes? Summaries of the old 
criminal law on marketing offences were republished in London 
in 1750, 1765, and at the end of the century. The leading legal 
treatises and abridgements on criminal and general law (Hawkins, 
1716, 1795; Bacon, 1778) approved its policy and (more import- 
antly), between 1754 and 1810 every one of the twenty-one 
editions of the leading guide for magistrates, Richard Bum's 
Justice of the Peace, reiterated that the marketing offences were 
still offences at common law. Traditionalists quoted one of the 
most famous judges of all: 'A Forestaller is called by my Lord 
Coke, Pauperum Depressor & totius Communitatis  & Patriae  pub- 
licus inimicus (a Depressor of the Poor, and a publick Enemy of 
the whole Community and to his Country), and therefore is 
punishable at Common Law'.29 This was the law as magistrates 
understood it should be. But Mansfield apparently believed that 
with the repeal of the statutes, the common-law offences also had 
perished. And he made the law: the bar probably believed  that 
in any case brought before him, he would require proof both of 
criminal intent to raise prices and that such had been the result. 
As a follower of Adam Smith, he was unlikely to find any evidence 
that met both those tests. What must be emphasized, however, 
is that by the end of the century, the issue was not yet resolved, 
either in the courts (there was no recent fully argued precedent) 
28 For some of Mansfield's  early connections with Smith, see Ross, Life of Adam 
Smith,  132, 158. 
29 W. Nelson,  The Office and Authority of a Justice of Peace, 2 vols. (London, 1745), 
i, 404, and subsequent editions, quoting Coke ( pt 3, ch. 89) on forestallers: for the 
last edition of Coke before Waddington's case, see Sir Edward Coke, The Third Part 
of the Institutes of the Laws of England, (London, 1797), 196. Coke in fact was quoting 
from a statute of Edward I. 
  
or in parliament . When prices rose, the public demanded enforce- 
ment. A year after Mansfield retired from the bench, the Times 
protested: 
It is equally surprising and unaccountable that all the wisdom and human- 
ity of our Ministers and Magistracy in England will not put an end to 
monopolies -forestalling markets, and keeping up the prices of all the 
necessaries of life to such an exorbitant pitch as they are at present. It is 
owing to this shocking Police, and cruel inattention to the poor, that our 
prisons are filled with insolvent debtors, our streets with beggars and 
pickpocket s, our highways with robbers and footpads, and thousands of 
indigent people of industry, with families, are literally starving.30 
The crises of 1795 and 1800-1 (the worst dearth of the century) 
made resolution imperative. Abstaining from legal interference 
with the markets, where there were acknowledged to be wide- 
spread practices of resale and buying outside the market, was the 
position of those who controlled parliamentary  majorities: 
William Pitt, the duke of Portland (the Home Secretary), William 
Wyndham Grenville (who argued that 'the best way would be to 
leave the grain to find its own value') and the duke of Richmond.31 
It was that of the leaders of the opposition (both Charles James 
Fox32 and his nephew, the third Lord Holland, supported Pitt's 
approach to the dearth); it was also, significantly, that of some 
Jacobin supporters of revolutionary  change.33 
There were traditionalists, however , even in cabinet. In 
September 1800, Lord Liverpool, president of the Board of 
Trade, received letters from Sir Joseph Banks and others blaming 
middlemen for the sufferings of the poor. Banks sympathized 
with the 'honest' rioting miners in  his neighbourhood (he had 
unsuccessfully tried to divert them with a prosecution of a baker 
and a forestaller) and argued that 'Smith's Principles [are] like 
those of the French Revolution breathing nothing but unqualified 
30 Times, 21 Oct. 1789. 
31 Grenville and Pitt read Wealth of Nat ions together in the 1780s and convinced 
themselves of its arguments: J. S. Girdler, Observations on the Pernicious Consequences 
of Foresta/ling, Regrating, and Engrossing (London, 1800), 58; Peter Jupp, Lord 
Grenville, 1759-1834 (Oxford, 1985), 47-8; Richmond to Portland, 25 Sept. 1800: 
Public Record Office, London (hereafter PRO), HO 42/51, fos. 455-7. 
32 'I have talked with Fox, who thinks all this is visionary (taught, I suppose, in 
other days by Burke)': 'Erskine to Kenyon, London, 15 Oct. 1800', in George T. 
Kenyon, The Life of Lloyd, First Lord Kenyon, Lord Chief Justice of England (London, 
1873), 373. In the debate on high prices in November 1795, Fox said he 'differed 
materially in no point' from Pitt, a point noted at Waddington's trial in Worcester: 
Berrow's Worcester J I, 31 July 1800; Wells, Wretched Faces, 234-5. 
33 Henry Richard, Lord Holland, M emoirs of the Whig Party during my Time, ed. 
Henry Edward, Lord Holland, 2 vols. (London, 1852), i, 166-9. 
 
 
 
 
  
liberty and are as little founded in reason & experience as the 
French are however specious they may appear to be'. Liverpool 
agreed there were conspiracies in the corn trade, which should 
not enjoy the freedom accorded other commerce. 'I do not mean 
to say', he wrote Banks, 'that our ancestors may not have carried 
these principles too far; but, I think, our modern Oeconomists 
have carried their principles to as great a degree of extravagance'. 
Smith 'pushed his principles to an extravagant length, and, in 
some respects, has erred . . . These principles are the favourites 
of all speculative men, who are averse to resort to the dull detail 
of facts'. Banks for his part sent Liverpool a memorandum  on 
the ancient law, arguing that forestallers were more active than 
they had been for 500 years. He recommended fines, pillory, 
prison and banishment, although not the baiting by dogs and 
whipping out of town he found in a statute of Edward I: 'Such 
a succession of punishment would I am convinced tame even Mr. 
Waddington, if it is necessary to resort  to a new enactment of 
these well considered laws'. Liverpool made some attempt to 
persuade his colleagues, including Henry Dundas and Portland, 
that practical experience called Smith's speculations into question, 
but apparently with no success; he abandoned the argument in 
October. 34 
Similar attachment to the old law could be found in parliament 
and the Common Council of London, as the attempts at legislation 
in the 1780s and 1790s show. Thus Sir Richard Hill, whom 
Kenyon held in esteem, wrote William Wilberforce in December 
1800, 'we are combatting imaginary famine in the midst of real 
plenty': 
 
I am indeed sory to see that the novel maxims of one scotchman, should 
be the rule of practice in all England and that the greatest men in the 
nation are kissing the toe of Pope Adam Smith. I heartily wish that The 
Wealth of Nations  may not contribute to make ours poor, by introducing 
 
 
34 A. Morris to Liverpool, 9 July 1800: British Library, London (hereafter Brit. 
Lib.), Add. MSS 38,234, fo. 100; also in the same volume of manuscripts, see Sir 
Joseph Banks to Liverpool,  3, 9, 16, 28, 29 Sept.  1800 (fos. 138ff., 140, 152, 164, 
166, 170); Richard George Robinson to Liverpool, Lichfield, [autumn] 1800 (fo. 170); 
P. D. Parquot to Liverpool, Warrington, 4 Nov. 1800 (fo. 228). See Liverpool to 
Sheffield, 30 July 1800: Brit. Lib., Add. MSS 38,311, fo. 68; also his letters to Henry 
Dundas, 15 Aug., 11 Oct. 1800 (fos. 65v, 83v); to John Kilshaw, 23 Sept. 1800 (fo. 
75v); to Sir Joseph Banks, 25 Sept. 1800 (fo. 75); to Portland, 9 Oct. 1800 (fo. 79v). 
See also Wells,  Wretched Faces, 65, 86-8, 197-8, 243-4. 
  
opinions which  strongly  militated  against  the  well  being  of  the 
middle class of individuals, as well as against the more indigent. 35 
Hill and those like him were delighted when it became clear that 
Kenyon, who had succeeded Mansfield as Lord Chief Justice, 
would not kiss Smith's toe. 
 
II 
THE LAW IN THE HANDS OF LORD KENYON 
In 1795, Kenyon announced on the summer assize circuit that 
forestalling was still indictable at common law, a reaffirmation of 
what was undoubtedly to be found in Coke and Hawkins and 
Burn, but a significant statement because it gave notice that if 
Mansfield had been hostile to the doctrine, Kenyon was not. His 
charge to the grand jury in his own county of Shropshire was 
reprinted  in many provincial newspapers: 
Gentlemen, since I have been in this place, a report has been handed to 
me, without any foundation I sincerely hope, that a set of private indi- 
viduals are plundering at the expence of public happiness, by endeavouring 
in this county, to purchase the grain now growing upon the soil! -For 
the sake of common humanity, I trust it is untrue: Gentlemen, you ought 
to be the champions against this hydra-headed monster. It is your duty, 
as Justices, to see justice done to the country! In your respective districts, 
as watchmen, be on your guard. 
He warned that anyone convicted before him would feel 'the full 
vengeance of the law . . . Neither purse, nor person, shall prevent 
it'. The grand jury in Shrewsbury immediately resolved that they 
would use all their powers against such illegal contracts and would 
punish   any  undermining   of  traditional   market   practices.   In 
 
35 Sir Richard Hill to William Wilberforce, 9 Dec. 1800: Bodleian Library, Oxford, 
Wilberforce MSS, c.3, fo. 51. Wilberforce himself remarked on the 'callousness, the 
narrow and foolish wisdom of servilely acquiescing in Adam Smith's general principles, 
without allowance for a thousand circumstances which take the case out of the 
province of that very general principle'. He wrote to Kenyon after Waddington's 
second conviction, but before sentencing: 'I feel deeply for the poor, I must say that 
it is trifling with them to announce that there is a sufficiency of food, unless it be at 
a price which is within their powers of payment'. He suggested  that  a maximum 
price (which Kenyon alluded to at trial) was desirable but not possible. A passage 
assuring the Chief Justice that any correspondence would remain  confidential,  and 
the passage quoted above, are not reprinted in the transcription: 'William Wilberforce 
to Kenyon, "near London'', 9 Jan. 1801', in HM C Kenyon, 555 no. 1419; Kenyon 
MSS, HMC 1419, Gredington. I am very grateful to the Rt Hon. Lord Kenyon, DL, 
for his extremely helpful assistance and for permission to quote from his papers at 
Gredington. 
 
 
 
 
  
November Mr Justice Ashhurst gave a similar charge in 
Middlesex. 36 
Even before the crisis of 1795, the Chief Justice's view of the 
law appears to have encouraged other traditionalists who shared 
it. In Staffordshire, the grand jury apparently considered (but 
rejected)  instituting  public  prosecutions  of  forestallers  and 
engrossers in 1793, following assizes held before Kenyon and 
Nash Grose, the other King's Bench judge who was to be most 
active in Waddington's case.37 The first prosecutions in the county 
since 1766 took place at Translation and Michaelmas quarter 
sessions of 1795, following an order of the magistrates that the 
Clerk  of  the  Peace  prosecute  at  the  public  expense. 38    In 
Wolverhampton the constables took several regrators to court, 
and this pattern of public enforcement is found in other coun- 
ties. 39 In July 1795, the Birmingham High Bailiff announced that 
all forestallers, and those who sold to them, would be prosecuted. 
Within months an association of 'many respectable Inhabitants', 
advertised repeatedly that they would pay for prosecutions and 
appoint detectives in the markets, in order to end 'these enormous 
abuses' and 'shameful practices'; they promised to publish the 
names of offenders and to reward citizens informing against such 
'pests of society'.40 Oxford City Council instructed the city solic- 
itor to prosecute all offenders dealing in corn, grain or flour and 
36 Shrewsbury Chron., 7 Aug. 1795; Berrow's Worcester J I, 13 Aug. 1795, quoted in 
Girdler, Observations on Forestalling, 298, who misdates it 1796; The Correspondence 
of Edmund Burke, ed. George H. Gutteridge, 10 vols. (Chicago, 1961), viii, 344. The 
offence of purchasing growing grain was considered a species of forestalling, according 
to a statement of Coke's quoted in most justices' manuals. On the timing of Kenyon's 
decision to emphasize the common law, see pt iv below. 
37 Staffordshire Record Office, Stafford (hereafter SRO), Q!SB, Michaelmas 1793, 
document 175, resolution of 10 October 1793 that the Clerk of the Peace prosecute 
any who 'forestalled or engrossed any market in the said county by buying up 
provisions before they are brought into open market'. The resolution is struck through 
and no such order appears in the Order Books. 
38 When Thomas Smallwood wrote to report a farmer, Robert Glover, for buying 
300 strike of barley, John Sparrow JP alluded to the repeal of the statutes against 
forestalling and suggested that only if Glover sold again in a distant market would it 
be an offence; he asked the clerk to give Smallwood a fuller answer: Thomas 
Smallwood to John Sparrow, Betley, 12 Sept. 1795: SRO, Q!SB, Michaelmas  1795, 
pt  l; also memorandum of Sparrow, 26 Sept. 1795. 
39 SRO, Q!SB, Michaelmas 1795, recommendation that John Salt be appointed clerk 
of Wolverhampton market. Reeves, Povey, Welch and Ward were all fined ls. and 
costs at Staffordshire sessions on promising not to offend again; Welch (who had 
regrated lamb) was  also imprisoned for four days: Aris' Birmingham Gaz., 12 Oct. 
1795. 
40 Aris' Birmingham Gaz., 6 July, 7, 14, 28 Sept., 12 Oct. 1795. 
  
offered a twenty-guinea reward.41 The following spring the city 
of Winchester offered twenty guineas in reward for information 
leading to convictions; there are many other examples. 42 
The prosecutions that took place in 1795-6, and the more 
numerous ones of 1800-1, were in part stimulated by the activities 
of a number of traditionalist country gentlemen, including Joseph 
Girdler of Maidenhead (Kent), who first offered rewards for 
convictions of forestallers, regrators and engrossers in the provin- 
cial papers in 1795. He spread the gospel through letters and 
handbills from the beginning of 1796, with some success; he was 
threatened with death as a result. He credited to his efforts a 
number of successful prosecutions and also a lawsuit, instigated 
in Common Pleas by the City of London, in which the plaintiff 
got a verdict and damages for regrating. 43 But Girdler's activities, 
and those of others now using the courts, meant that the old 
common-law doctrine would be thoroughly considered in litiga- 
tion at a time when the supporters of political economy were also 
intent on victory. 
The dearth of 1795-6 generated, as we have seen, highly 
charged attacks on Kenyon's doctrine, notably Burke's denunci- 
ation of any interference with market forces.  The prosecutions 
in 1795-6 at the behest of local government remained at  that 
level; parliament and Pitt, having rejected the notion of restoring 
some statute law on the marketing offences a decade before, did 
so again in 1797.44 By 1800, even some traditionalists were begin- 
ning to wonder whether the old doctrine was defensible. In April 
1796 a wealthy Bedfordshire farmer, Thomas Battams, had 
pleaded guilty at Buckingham sessions to regrating fourteen quar- 
ters of oats at a profit of 6d. a quarter. The chairman, the marquis 
of Buckingham, had had Battams watched by two magistrates in 
order to get the evidence to convict him, and the prosecution 
was by a county subscription. At the sessions Buckingham warmly 
denounced the crime and a very large bench of justices sentenced 
Battams to fourteen days in gaol and a fine of £200. Some of the 
press  commented  that  the  law  'throws  a  man  entirely  on  the 
41 Oxford Council Aas, 1752-1801, ed. M. G. Hobson (Oxford, 1962), 233 (8 July 
1795). This was two weeks before Kenyon sat there at the summer assizes noted 
below. For the harvest crisis in 1795, see Wells, Wretched Faces, 84-5, pa ssim. 
42 Hampshire Chron., 23 Apr. 1796. I have not made a systematic search of the 
local press. 
43 Girdler, Observations on Forestalling, 209-15, 288, 295-7. 
44  On 1797, see Hay, 'Moral Economy, Political Economy, and Law'. 
 
 
 
 
  
mercy of the Justices' and that 'no respectability of character can 
screen the offender from severe punishment'. 45 At the time 
Buckingham thought the consequence was a salutary fall in prices 
and had no doubts about the value of the prosecution. But four 
years later, in 1800, he noted, 'as I have frequently been obliged 
to argue with some whose opinions have great weight with me, 
and who doubted not only the policy, but the law of our proceed- 
ings in that case, I have paused upon one or two opportunities 
of making similar examples'. To settle those doubts, he wrote to 
Lord Kenyon for reassurance that the offence was indeed punish- 
able at common law.46 
In short, if the common law was to continue to be put into 
effect, Kenyon and his brother judges needed to do two things: 
establish a modern authoritative precedent by a judgement after 
full argument by counsel; and encourage prosecutions  through 
the most public discussion of the grounds of that judgement. By 
the time that Buckingham wrote, as corn prices mounted to 
vertiginous heights, Kenyon and several of the other eleven 
common-law judges had been busy for some months working to 
those ends. 
The judges knew by January 1800 that three cases were likely 
to come before them. Two were indictments of John Rusby, a 
prosperous factor in the Corn Exchange in Marks Lane, who was 
prosecuted at the City of London Sessions in late 1799 for regrat- 
ing and engrossing .47   The prosecutor  chose to have the indict- 
 
45 Northampton M ercury, 23 Apr. 1796; Berrow's Worcester J I, 28 Apr. 1796; 
Shrewsbury Chron., 29 Apr. 1796; Girdler, Observations on Forestalling, 215, later 
noted that a similar prosecution in Oxfordshire resulted in only a 5s. fine. 
46 Buckingham was probably referring to William Wyndham Grenville, Lord 
Grenville, his younger brother, who was a convinced follower of Adam Smith: Jupp, 
Lord Grenville; Buckingham to Kenyon, Stowe, 8 July 1800: Kenyon MSS, box 23; 
Kenyon, L ife of Kenyon, 374-6; Girdler, Observations on Forestalling , 214, 296. 
47 At trial Kenyon remarked that he was not aware of the case coming on, but he 
probably meant that he was unsure of the exact date: Trial of J ohn Rushy in the Court 
of K ing's Bench, Guildhall, London (London, 1800), 7. The first indictment charged 
Rushy with engrossing 90 quarters of wheat to sell the same day, with three additional 
counts for doing so by contracting, and with the intention to sell at 'excessive and 
unreasonable rates and prices' . The second indictment was for buying 90 quarters of 
oats at 4ls. per quarter and regrating by selling 30 quarters in the same market on 
the same day for 43s. per quarter, in eight counts slightly varying one from another. 
The prosecutor of both was Richard Snell and the indictments appear to have been 
drawn very carefully. See Appendix. There is an abstract of the Trial of John Rushy, 
in Girdler, Observations on For estalling , 231-60; another report was published as The 
Trial at Large of John Rushy, Corn-Factor, f or Regrating  Corn (London, 1800). 
  
ments removed on writ of certiorari into King's Bench. 48 The 
indictments arrived there at the beginning of Hilary term, in 
January 1800, but many months might elapse before they could 
yield a satisfactory precedent and such a prosecution might well 
be dropped or compounded before that happened. 49 Kenyon and 
his brother judges were therefore almost certainly delighted by 
the prosecution of Waddington, begun before them directly in 
January 1800. 
Between 22 January and 5 February, Kenyon, Grose, Simon 
LeBlanc and Soulden Lawrence, the four judges of King's Bench, 
supervised the taking of affidavits at the Guildhall, in chambers 
and even at Kenyon's home. Witnesses from Kent swore that 
Waddington had bought large quantities of hops and announced 
his intention of creating a scarcity in the market by investing 
some £80,000. 50 In short, both act and intent were likely to be 
made out at trial. The prosecution was brought by the  hop- 
factors allied with the London brewers, who deeply resented 
Waddington (who had only entered the trade in 1798) for trying 
to manipulate a market that they ordinarily  sought  to control. 
The growers needed credit until the crop was sold, but 
Waddington subverted the brewers' hold over them by extending 
credit himself,  establishing a bank  as part of his strategy. The 
brewers and London factors were therefore unlikely to spare 
expense, or drop the prosecution; it appears that one of the 
prosecuting counsel was a partner in one of the main hop-factors' 
houses. 51 Moreover, the prosecution was mounted in the most 
dramatic, expensive and speedy manner possible, through a crim- 
 
48 A possible motive would be to help establish a precedent  by bringing the case 
eventually before the justices of King's Bench, but it is also possible that the intention 
was simply to make the prosecution oppressively expensive for the defendant: see D. 
Hay, Crown Side Cases in the Court of King's Bench (Staffs. Hist. Soc., forthcoming). 
49 The usual course would be for the charges to be sent for trial at the next sitting 
of nisi prius in the jurisdiction from which they arose, but there could be delays. In 
Rusby's case the trial, because the issue arose in the City of London, was before a 
justice of King's Bench, and in fact Kenyon heard the case in July 1800 (see below). 
But a precedent binding upon all other courts could only be  established  certainly 
after arguments on a motion for a new trial or in arrest of judgement, if the defendant 
made such motions,  as the court doubtless expected Rushy  to do. He did, and the 
arguments on the motions did not take place until late November  1800 (Appendix). 
so PRO, KB 1130, Hilary 1800, no. 48, deposition of Thomas Knipe, sworn at 
Kenyon's house, Lincoln's Inn Fields, 22 Jan.  1800. 
51  Peter Mathias,  The Brewing  Industry  in England,  1700-1830 (Cambridge,  1959), 
517-19; S. F. Waddington, An Appeal  to the  British  Hop-Planters  (London,  1800), 
11, 20, 28, passim. 
  
inal information in King's Bench. 52 A criminal information 
involved many stages of process, all of which were exploited in 
the proceedings against Waddington, with the advantage for 
Kenyon and his brother judges that the state of the law began to 
be argued in open court months before Rusby's case was heard 
on 4 July. 53 By then, Waddington's case had been the subject of 
widely reported arguments on seven occasions in February, May, 
June and early July. 
Thus, on 8 February, Kenyon and Grose welcomed Erskine's 
application for an information against Waddington for the Kent 
offence, granting a rule nisi for more than one information, since 
Erskine mentioned offences in more than one county. Erskine, 
prosecuting, said it was 'a Misdemeanour . . . which, I believe, 
is much oftener practised than punished: and I am not very sure 
that in my time any similar application has been made to the 
Court'. He used the main arguments reiterated or adapted in the 
months to come,  quoting Lord Coke's  remark that forestallers 
ought to be ostracized as oppressors of the poor and enemies of 
the community, describing Waddington and his agents as 'locusts' 
who had in their 'talons' the entire crop. He concluded: 'The 
subject is of immense moment'. The Lord Chief Justice echoed 
immediately: 'It is of immense moment'. Both were aware that 
this case would probably be the best one to determine the state 
of the law. 54 
While the lawyers prepared for the next stage of argument in 
the cases, the judges went on circuit to clear the county gaols and 
hear civil causes at nisi prius. Mr Justice Grose of King's Bench 
had  already   charged   the   two   Middlesex   Grand  Juries   on 
5 February  that forestalling, regrating  and engrossing were still 
52 Such charges could be laid only when the judges considered the offence a grave 
misdemeanour of public importance; presumably  prosecuting  counsel knew enough 
of Kenyon's views to be sure of success. The only faster way would have been an 
information ex officio by the Attorney General. It is clear that the government would 
not have agreed to such a prosecution. 
53 Motion for a rule granting the information, based on the affidavits and on oral 
argument by counsel, followed by trial in King's Bench or in the county of the offence 
and then judgement and sentence in King's Bench, with ample opportunities for 
arguments for a change of venue or (on conviction) for motions for a new trial or in 
arrest of judgement  (Appendix). 
54 Times, 10 Feb. 1800; Proceedings in the Cause the King v. Waddington, 8-10. They 
were probably also not unaware that Waddington, for reasons discussed below, would 
be a particularly appropriate sacrifice to justice. On the arguments used in the case 
on this and other occasions, see below. Erskine argued his first case in King's Bench 
in 1778. 
  
offences at common  law, quite contrary to the common belief 
that the 1772 statute had ended the offence: he read aloud from 
Hawkins's Pleas of the Crown to prove it.ss At spring assizes the 
same message was taken to the country. In Northumberland  (and 
presumably other counties), Robert  Graham, recently appointed 
to the Exchequer bench, deplored the repeal of the statutes, and 
anticipated the outcome of Rusby and Waddington, urging his 
grand jurors to fight the evil of market malpractice 'which, he 
felt much gratified in perceiving, was now beginning to be viewed 
in its proper light, and would soon, he hoped, be done away, to 
the great and lasting benefit of the community at large'. At the 
Norwich assizes, another Baron of the Exchequer, Beaumont 
Hotham, charged his grand jurors on forestallers, concluding that 
'those who dragged forth those pests of  society,  and  brought 
them to justice, deserved the commendation of every part of the 
community'. On 21 June, Grose again reminded the Middlesex 
grand juries in King's Bench  that the offences incurred heavy 
penalties at common law. His charge too amounted to an invita- 
tion to prosecute. s6 
Meanwhile Waddington made his own case worse. While the 
judges   were  exhorting  grand  juries   at  assizes,  he  went   to 
Worcester,  the most  important  hop-growing  region  after Kent. 
With the Kent charge due to be first argued in King's Bench on 
5 May,s7  he openly encouraged the hop-growers and dealers at 
Worcester  to  hold  out  against  the  London  factors  for  higher 
prices, claimed that the prosecution against him had been dropped 
and entered  into forehand  contracts with a number  of growers 
for progressively  higher prices.  When  the new term opened in 
King's Bench, the prosecution supplied new affidavits on which 
Erskine  obtained,  in  the  following  term,  a  second  criminal 
information against Waddington for his effrontery in Worcester . 
Both the prosecution  and Kenyon must have been delighted. 
The city of Worcester had its own assizes and the jury there was 
likely to contain consumers disturbed by high food prices rather 
than by hop-growers hoping for a rise in the market, which was 
 
 
55  Times, 5, 10 Feb.  1800. 
56 Girdler, Observations on Forestalling, 336-7; Times, 24 June 1800. 
57 Argument for a rule absolute. Waddington did  not  defend  the  charge  at  this 
point , because he believed the court was sure to rule against him: Summary of the 
Trial, 6. His intention was probably  to try for an acquittal at trial. 
  
the case in Kent, where a county jury would hear the case.58 And 
the times were ripe for such a conviction: food prices had con- 
tinued to rise, to reach the first of two unexampled peaks at just 
this juncture. This first  hearing  on  the  Worcester  offence  on 
16 May also allowed Erskine, for the prosecution, and Kenyon, 
from the bench, to prepare the minds of any jurors who read the 
newspapers. Erskine declared: 'I pray your Lordships for a 
moment to suppose, that I am not speaking of hops, but of corn, 
and then see how easy it is to apply what is done in one instance, 
to another, and then say, what is to become of the people of this 
country?'59 In turn, Kenyon, at this early stage of the proceedings, 
made clear his opinion of Adam Smith: 
It is said, that people have no more reason to fear forestalling, engrossing, 
and regrating, than they have to fear witchcraft. It is easy for a man to 
write a treatise in his closet; but if he would go to the distance of 200 
miles from London, and were to observe people at every avenue of a 
country town, buying up butter, cheese, and all the necessaries of life they 
can lay hold of, in order to prevent them from coming to market (which 
has happened to my knowledge), he would find, that this is something 
more real, and substantial, than the crime of witchcraft. The  country 
suffers most grievously by it.60 
Finally, Waddington again assisted his opponents. Erskine 
came to court with the news that Waddington had dared to 
publish a pamphlet in which he attacked the Kent criminal 
information as a lettre de cachet, derided the sworn testimony, 
defended his actions at length as an attack on monopoly and told 
the hop-growers that they were the real defendants. He had also 
published an appeal to the Kent hop-growers in the county 
newspaper. King's Bench immediately granted Erskine a rule to 
remove the trial from Kent, where jurors' minds might be influ- 
enced, to Middlesex. The trial therefore would take place in 
King's Bench itself, before Kenyon, with a London special jury. 
Even if the Worcester jury acquitted, or  Rusby's case  failed, 
there was now an excellent chance for a conviction of 
Waddington. The pre-trial strategy of the prosecution was 
complete. 61 
 
58 In April, the mayor and magistrates of Worcester advertised their determination 
to punish offenders against the marketing  laws: Berrow's  Worcester JI, 10 Apr. 1800. 
59 Summary of the Trial, 3. 
60 Ibid., 5-6, emphasis in the original. For the comparison to witchcraft, see Smith, 
Wealth of Nations, IV. v. b.26 (ed. Todd, i, 534). 
61 Waddington, Appeal to the British  Hop-Planters; Kentish  Chron., 22 May  1800. 
The Appeal  is dated  10 March (37). Law, for Waddington, argued that there was no 
(cont. on p. 121) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
They  were  also  successful  at  trial.  Rusby  was  convicted  in 
London on 4 July of regrating, before a crowded court in a trial 
lasting  all day.  On  the  29 July  Waddington  was  convicted  in 
Worcester  of forestalling,  after a trial lasting  from 8 a.m.  to 8 
p.m.: the guilty verdict was greeted with cheers by the crowd.62 
The London jury found him guilty again on 8 December for his 
activities in Kent. All three verdicts were subsequently questioned 
in further proceedings,  in motions for new trials or in arrest of 
judgement,   but  the  judges  were  anxious  to  assert  from  the 
moment of the first verdicts that  the law had been established. 
Kenyon, congratulating  Rusby's jurors,  declared:  'Gentlemen, a 
precedent  made in a Court of Justice that will stem the torrent 
of such affliction to the poor, is certainly useful to the public'; 
and Mr Justice Grose, passing sentence on Waddington, remarked 
on 'the present moment, when a precedent is so peculiarly called 
for, which may operate as an example to others upon a subject 
which  so materially  concerns  the Public'. 63  How  these  verdicts 
(and  the  judgements   based  on  them)  were  constructed  and 
defended is illuminating.  Technical points of law, broad public 
policy and the new science of political economy were all cited by 
the lawyers and the judges.  They were not of equal importance. 
Technical  law does not,  in fact, seem to have  carried  much 
weight with either side, for it was inconclusive.  There were the 
common legal quibbles that earlier cases had been badly reported 
or had become irrelevant in the light of later statutes and cases. 
The  defence  argued  that  the  preamble  of  the  1772 repealing 
statute showed parliament's intention to end all such prosecutions, 
that Coke himself had enforced forehand bargains, and that the 
most recent leading cases for the common law offences were 200 
years  old.  The prosecution  countered  that  the  statute law  had 
interfered  with  the  (superior)  common  law,  hence  the  repeal. 
 
( n. 61 cont. ' 
precedent  for moving the case to King's Bench: it should have gone to an adjoining 
county assizes. Neither the prosecution nor the judges replied to this point. 
62 Annual Register (1800), ii, 25; Times, 4 Aug.  1800; Brit.  Gaz., 3 Aug.  1800. On 
12 July, two Newport butchers were convicted at Clerkenwell sessions of forestalling 
Smithfield; the press reported that the sentences were only fines of £20 and  three 
months imprisonment, 'being the first examples since these sort of prosecutions fell 
into disuse': Morning  Chron., 14 July  1800. 
63 Trial of John Rushy, 37; Girdler, Observations on Forestalling, 260; Trial against 
Samuel Ferrand Waddington, 189. Grose's use of the word 'precedent' appears also in 
Times, 29 Jan. 1801, although the law  report  gives  'punishment'  (1 East  166; 102 
ER 65). 
  
Kenyon simply cited Coke's damning  words  against  profiteers 
and held that the statute of Edward VI was declaratory of the 
common law as it had stood from Saxon times. 64 The defence 
cited a decision of 1631 to prove that hops were not a victual; 
the prosecution countered that they had  become  such because 
beer was now essential to sailors at war, hence to national 
defence!65 Erskine eventually moved to the position that the 
marketing offences could be committed with any commodity, not 
just foodstuffs. 66 When the defence tried to show that the old 
cases involved only actual monopoly, the prosecution (and 
Kenyon) simply ignored the argument. 
Important issues of actual harm  and criminal intent, and the 
origins of the prosecutions, were also raised, and also ignored by 
the bench. The defence argued that no actual harm was proven, 
that it had not  been clearly shown that Waddington raised the 
price and that, in any case, an intent to do what is not a crime, 
is not a crime. Erskine merely reiterated that to use any device 
to raise the price of any commodity was an offence; the intent, 
in any case, was clear. These issues of harm and intent, largely 
ignored by the judges in 1801, were to become very important 
within a few years. The argument about the origin of the prosecu- 
tion arose because criminal informations could only be granted 
to prosecutors who came with 'clean hands'. Waddington and his 
counsel knew who they were: London brewers and hop-factors, 
who constantly made similar contracts, but who resented 
Waddington's attempt to contest their control of the planters 
through their own price-fixing and credit arrangements. The 
problem for the defence was that the identity of the prosecutors 
was not a matter of record and was not raised early enough in 
the case. All references to their identity and activities had to be 
ironic, allusive or indirect, and could not be made in open argu- 
 
64 Proceedings in the Cause the King v. Waddington, 2-3, 8-9, 61, 64, 66-7, 69, 74; 
Times, 12 Feb.  1801. 
65 Proceedings in the Cause the King v. Waddington, 1, 65; Summary of the Trial, 
42-3,  45  n.;  Trial  against  Samuel  Ferrand   Waddington,  142.  The  hops  case  was 
R. v. Maynard (1631), Cro.Car. 231 (79 ER 802); it  was  well  known  because 
widely reported in the standard justices' manuals and abridgements as late as the 
1790s. 
66 Proceedings in the Cause the King v. Waddington, 1, 4, 27. In doing so, Erskine 
began arguing that, since engrossing or raising the price of wheat was an offence, the 
same must be true of hops, the reverse of his argument when Waddington's Cases 
began. Rushy had been convicted in the interval. 
 
 
 
 
  
ment. The prosecution did not have to reply to allegations that 
others did what Waddington had done.67 
Indeed, it did not even try to prove that Waddington had 
affected the market in hops (the witnesses flatly contradicted one 
another), but simply asserted that conspiracies did exist, that the 
poor were starving, and that the one caused the other. In other 
words, narrowly legal arguments were almost irrelevant: the cases 
were actually an extended rhetorical contest to denigrate, or 
legitimate, Smith's theory of markets and its application to hops, 
then corn. 68 
Bargains for future delivery of growing crops were the rule in 
the hop trade, essential  to the security of growers of a highly 
uncertain crop, and Waddington made them openly. This defence 
argument was crucial because Waddington's forehand contracts, 
on a rising scale of prices, looked to an outsider very like a 
deliberate attempt to move the market up, although the case law 
shows a brewer using one to secure his malt as early as 1532. But 
the suspicions on the bench probably went deeper. Patrick Atiyah 
has pointed out how foreign to a lawyer of traditional cast of 
mind such a contract could appear. The wholly executory con- 
tract, for future performance, he argues, was not then the para- 
digm that it was to become in the nineteenth century. A notion 
of an underlying equivalence in bargains, however  attenuated, 
was still part of the way that judges thought. To such men, the 
very idea of making a profit through a price rise on a forehand 
contract might be thought immoral if its results were against 
public policy. This clearly was the view of Erskine and Kenyon. 
Erskine apparently did not believe that the usual practices in the 
hop trade could be considered a defence, as it was presented; he 
used it against Waddington. Kenyon, in his private bench notes, 
marked particularly all the  testimony  proving  'forehand 
bargains'. 69 
To the argument  that Waddington  controlled  far too little of 
67 Proceedings in the Cause the King v. Waddington, 2, 62, 64, 73, 72; Summary of 
the Trial, 17, 20, 25; Trial against Samuel Ferrand Waddington, 125, 57, 118, 121, 
129-30. The doctrine of clean hands, part of equity, applied also in King's Bench 
with respect to criminal informations: see Hay, Crown Side Cases. 
68 There were also two arguments that the evidence did not prove exactly what the 
information charged, but Kenyon rejected one and ignored the other: Proceedings in 
the Cause the King v. Waddington, 71, 76; Summary of the Trial, 26. Kenyon seldom 
wrote his judgements:  Kenyon, Life of K enyon, 391. 
69 Atiyah uses the law reports of these cases as part of his general argument. The 
reports do not, of course, show how much effort Waddington's counsel put into the 
( cont . on p. 124) 
  
the market to be convicted of engrossing, the prosecution  (and 
Kenyon) replied that he had boasted of doing so, that ten men 
might control the market, or simply that he and his agents had 
swept the market like 'locusts'. This was the venerable rhetoric 
of the traditional moral economy and, to counter it, Edward Law, 
Waddington's counsel, used both practical and theoretical argu- 
ments.  The  practical  one  was  that  middlemen  were  essential, 
particularly  to supply London.  The statute of  Edward  VI was 
'insane': the old law would starve the capital in two days. To this 
highly practical argument Kenyon made the extraordinary reply 
that the statesmen of Edward VI, and equally those of Elizabeth 
I and James I, were neither 'insane', nor 'ideots'. The legislation 
of Edward VI might well be better than that of 12 George III.70 
Kenyon's irritation arose from the fact that the principal argu- 
ment of the defence was a condescending lesson in political econ- 
omy.  Mistaken  notions  on the  bench  and  elsewhere  could  be 
corrected by exposure to the wisdom of Dr Smith, author of that 
'learned  and  luminous  performance   . . .  upon  the  wealth  of 
nations,  from the reading  of which no person,  however  richly 
endowed with previous knowledge, ever arose, without finding 
his  funds  of   knowledge   and   information   amply   increased, 
enlarged, and improved'.  Law lectured Kenyon  on the wisdom 
of Smith's devotee, that 'eminent and eloquent person', Edmund 
Burke, and of some of the 'ablest', 'most enlightened',  'warmly 
benevolent',  'judicious' men in the recent history of parliament, 
who had seen to the enactment of the repealing statute of 1772. 
And he reminded the Chief Justice that the repeal now bore the 
imprimatur  of both Fox and Pitt. 
( n. 69 cont.) 
effort to educate the bench in trade practices and economic theory; Atiyah also 
incorrectly represents Ellenborough as sharing Kenyon's opinions. Kenyon does seem 
to exemplify Atiyah's account of the eighteenth-century bench's unease with certain 
kinds of contracts for future performance. Waddington complained in 1811 that 
Kenyon had  nonsuited him in King's Bench repeatedly when he sued farmers for 
non-payment  on forehand contracts. I have not found these cases, but see below at 
n. 161 for Waddington's lawsuits against Bristow and others. The Reports of Sir John 
Spelman, ed. J. H. Baker (Seldon Soc., xciv, 1978), 247; Atiyah, Rise and Fall of 
Freedom of Contract, 128-9, 363-5, 528; Proceedings in the Cause the King v. 
Waddingion, 27ff., 39, 47-8, 57, 67-8, 73; Summary of the Trial, 38; Trial against 
Samuel Ferrand  Waddington, 85; Kenyon MSS, Term 3 Dec. 1800 to 18 Feb. 1801; 
PRO, HO 42/ 116, fos. 144-5, petition of Samuel Ferrand Waddington to the Prince 
Regent, Tonbridge Wells, 4 July 1811, enclosed with a letter from Waddington to 
the Prince Regent, Southboro Tonbridge, 4 July 1811. 
70 Proceedings in the Cause the King ·v. Waddington, 2-3, 62-3, 75; Summary of the 
Trial, 36, 50; Trial against Samuel Ferrand Waddington, 139. 
 
 
 
 
  
To this (hardly legal) argument, Law had the temerity to add 
a fairly extensive seminar in supply and demand, the rationing 
functions of markets in dearth, the 'general principles of com- 
merce', the merits of the trading interest of the nation and the 
mysteries of price theory. He quoted Burke: 
The market settles, and alone can settle, that price. Market is the meeting 
and conference of the consumer and producer, when they mutually dis- 
cover each others wants. Nobody, I believe, has observed with any 
reflection what market is, without being astonished at the truth, the 
correctness, the civility, the general equity with which the balance  of 
wants is settled. They who wish the destruction of that  balance,  and 
would fain, by arbitrary regulations, decree, that defective production 
should not be compensated by increased price, directly lay their axe to 
the root of production itself. 
So much for arbitrary Chief Justices: mistaken, uncivil, inequit- 
able, when compared to the market mechanism. Or at least some 
Chief Justices: Law pointedly remarked on Lord Mansfield's 
enlightened hostility to the marketing laws.71 
From the beginning of the prosecutions Kenyon had known 
that his chief adversary was the dead professor from Glasgow. 
Throughout the case and some others in the same months he had 
attacked Smith as an impractical theorist, Burke as someone 
'equally speculative'. He scorned Smith's comparison of the old 
marketing laws with those against witchcraft and declared that 
he would not enter into a discussion of The Wealth of Nations. 
The Lord  Chief Justice deplored the repeal of 1772 and called 
for the re-enactment of the old statute laws. Fortunately, the 
common law had been left untouched. It is clear that Kenyon 
was a man with some robust and unfashionable notions, as well 
as a readiness to find in the law what he thought important. In 
short, he was much like many other  judges  of this - indeed, 
all -periods. What he found  important was the immorality  of 
playing the markets, the nefariousness of starving the poor. He 
thought the offences real, and human suffering their result. 72 
For the case was dominated not by law, but by the tremendous 
crisis of dearth in 1800 and 1801. Its enormous pressure was felt 
throughout  all the proceedings:  crowds packed  the courtrooms; 
 
71 Proceedings in the Cause the King v. Waddington, 2, 61, 63, 70, 73; Summary of 
the Trial, 34, 43-4, 46; Trial against Samuel Ferrand Waddington, 124, 137, 144. Law 
was quoting Burke, Thoughts and Details on Scarcity: see above, n. 27. 
72 Times, 17 May, 9 June, 21 Nov.  1800; also 'Law Report, Dent v. Howes',  Times, 
7 June 1800; General Evening Post, 7 June 1800; Proceedings in the Cause the King v. 
Waddington,  5. 
  
cheers greeted the guilty verdicts. Waddington's lawyers begged 
the juries  to forget popular  prejudice,  to beware  inflaming the 
minds of the people.  The prosecution  regularly  countered with 
references to 'this awful and alarming crisis', and claims that, if 
'to  starve  the  people  had  been  his  object',  Waddington  could 
have done no more. Counsel on both sides involved themselves 
in contradictions.  Waddington's  lawyers pleaded  with juries  to 
think only of hops, but argued also that free trade supplied towns 
with corn. The prosecution argued that the statutes were repealed 
in 1772 because corn, unlike hops, could not be engrossed, and 
then made the forbidden analogy in order to demand a precedent 
on hops that  could in turn be applied to corn. Erskine  'prayed 
their  Lordships,  . . .  and  every  person  who  heard  him,  for  a 
moment, to suppose that he was not  speaking of Hops, but  of 
Corn, and then say, what was to become  of the people  of this 
country'.  Law, for his part, came to rest the defence case on a 
general proposition  of immense resonance:  'Instances like these 
must strike at the root and foundation of all property, and every 
right of the free controul and disposition in respect of the same'. 73 
These were questions of utmost moment, and the government 
was unequivocally giving a different answer from Kenyon's. We 
must ask why there was such a sharp discrepancy  between  the 
bench and the parliamentary  leaders; and we must explain why 
Kenyon's doctrine was abandoned so rapidly after his death. 
 
III 
THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR MORAL ECONOMY 
 
Kenyon's dismissive comments about commercial practice,  his 
own admission of ignorance about the London corn market, 
suggest how different he was from Mansfield, with his merchant 
juries and project to re-order commercial law. But much of 
Kenyon's response to the cases and the way that it was expressed 
also appears to have come from his own knowledge of the suf- 
fering caused by the dearth of the years 1799-1801, as well as 
from the dictates of his faith. 
Kenyon was one of the wealthiest of the judges in a generation 
of conspicuous judicial wealth, although he was of humbler origins 
 
73 Summary of the Trial, 21, 48; Proceedings in the Cause the King v. Waddington, 4, 
71; Trial against Samuel Ferrand Waddington, 147; Times, 17 May 1800. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
than some. He was typical of many eighteenth-century lawyers 
(unlike those of the nineteenth) who made a fortune from the 
profession and then sought to establish a landed dynasty. With a 
reputation for parsimony, he poured all of his fees into the estate 
he assembled at Hanmer  in Shropshire. In his new role as a 
territorial magnate, he embraced the paternalist repertoire of the 
benevolent country gentleman, a role that in any case was to be 
expected considering his religious convictions (which were prob- 
ably particularly acute at about this time). 74 
The dearth of 1799-1801 hit hard at Hanmer. Even during the 
harvest of 1800 a Shropshire labourer could not earn enough to 
feed a family of any size. One consequence was housebreaking in 
the neighbourhood, but no damage was done, as the thieves 
looked only for food. Although he was in London most of the 
time, the Chief Justice ensured that his poor were relieved, 
instructing a niece at Hanmer to buy corn and sell it at less than 
market price. She wrote regularly about the results: 'I have this 
morning been again dispensing part of my dear Uncles bounty at 
Hanmer. I don't know what would have become of the poor but 
for him'. 'May the blessings of 64 poor people come upon my 
dear Uncle and all his family'. The poor came to a parlour 
window, described their wants and presumably their industri- 
ousness, and received a ticket from Kenyon's niece describing 
their entitlement. They took the ticket to a tenant's buildings to 
receive the corn. All this entailed standing in the rain all day, 
waiting while the line moved up to the window to get the ticket 
for food, 'for which they did All seem truly thankful to My dear 
Uncle'. He apparently gave instructions that only the truly deser- 
ving should be relieved, and his niece wrote him that she would 
not be so free next time,  but choose those 'in much want  yet 
very striving'. The results were gratifying in every way. In the 
summer of  1800 Kenyon's son wrote to him that the people 'all 
joined in thanks to you for your bounty to them last winter which 
has very far exceeded that of any of the neighbouring gentlemen, 
& without which several of them declare they think they would 
have been starved'. The following year Kenyon's  family again 
sold corn at the parlour window. He also sent down twenty-four 
pairs of blankets and other goods for the poor of Hanmer, a 
response to letters from Shropshire pointing out that the expense 
74 Daniel Duman,  The Judicial  Bench  in England,  1727-1875  (London,  1982), 128, 
140-3; Kenyon,  Life  of  Kenyon,  393-6. 
  
of corn was so great that nothing was left for fire or clothing in 
a labourer's family if there were a number of children. How 
appalling that so much of this suffering should be unnecessary: 
Lady Kenyon wrote, 'I wish one knew how to soften the Hearts 
of Corn dealers, but Corn is now 20s . . . tho there are such 
Quantities of Grain coming in daily'.75 
Strangers too wrote to Kenyon in his capacity as Chief Justice, 
confirming what he knew from his own family. An anonymous 
correspondent from County Durham blamed the 'villainy' of 
'wealthy base men' on the public statements of Portland and 
Grenville. A man in Norwich sent Kenyon detailed suggestions 
for detecting and punishing forestallers and regrators, suggestions 
originally intended for his MP, 'but as I found that he was fearfull 
that it would hurt him in the opinion of his constituents, the 
principal part of whom are in the Corn Trade . . . and recollecting 
that your Lordships Justice and zeal had prompted You to be 
active for the comfort of the Poor, I thought I could not do better 
than to direct it to Your Lordships attention'. Kenyon's widely 
reported statements in court thus brought to his notice the extent 
to which many shared his opinions and  the existence of hard 
evidence of illegal practices, evidence that it seemed could not 
be brought  to the attention of parliament. 76 
This traditional explanation for the dearth, always popular with 
landed country gentlemen, was much less convincing to the 
London legal and political elites. Country gentlemen read Burn's 
Justice of the Peace, with its reiteration of Coke's strictures on 
engrossing middlemen, but London barristers and members of 
parliament were more likely to read The Wealth of Nations or 
Barrington's Observations on the More Ancient Statutes, or Burke. 
And lawyers, as professional men without country estates, were 
also less likely to have the direct experience of local paternalism 
shown in Kenyon's correspondence with his niece. There were 
also other, long-standing, tensions between Kenyon and the bar. 
 
75 T. Hanmer to Hon. George Kenyon, Hot Wells, Bristol, 16 July 1800: Kenyon 
MSS, box 23; also in box 23, see Lady Hanmer to Kenyon, Bettisfield, [5 Feb.?] 
1800, about selling corn valued at 14s. 7d. a measure for 8s.; Lady Hanmer to Kenyon, 
8 Apr. 1800 (she noted, however, that 'very very few' had relief from the parish); 
Richard Kenyon to Kenyon, Chester, 2 Aug. 1800; in box 25, see M. Hanmer to 
Kenyon, 18 Feb. 1801; Lady Kenyon to one of her children, 4 Aug.  [1801]. 
76 Anonymous letter to Kenyon from co. Durham, 14 Feb. 1801: Kenyon MSS, 
box 25; for Samuel Bream to Kenyon, Norwich, 24 Oct. 1800, enclosing his letter of 
8 Oct. to 'Honoured Sir', see box 24. 
 
 
 
 
  
He was respected as an able enough judge, but his indifference 
to appearance, and his origins, made him a subject of jest to some 
lawyers. An attorney before he was a barrister, and with only a 
little Latin, he was not popular with those who felt the rough 
side of his tongue. They retaliated by portraying him as uncouth 
and avaricious. 77 
On the other hand, he was often popular  with the press and 
with the wider public, in part because he castigated the sins of 
the mighty as well as the humble. His moral crusades provoked 
much indignation and amusement in his later years. He was the 
scourge of adulterers who found themselves  in  his courtroom. 
He condemned gaming and threatened 'the first ladies  in  the 
land', if they were guilty, with the pillory. Duellists who commit- 
ted murder, and journalists who spread scandalous libels about 
private persons, particularly innocent young ladies, enraged him. 
In all of this he was contesting some of the principle pastimes of 
the aristocracy, and such criticisms from a man bred a mere 
attorney, one who had not even been to university, was doubly 
insulting. 
Kenyon was also critical of cheating farmers or tradesmen who 
did not behave with propriety. 78 In the year before Waddington's 
Case, he made clear his role as chief moral censor in the market- 
 
77 William C. Townshend, The Lives of Twelve Eminent Judges (London, 1846), 116, 
123; Public Characters, 4th edn, 10 vols. (London, 1799-1809); Kenyon, Lif e of 
Kenyon, 87, 136, 393, 402. On the legal and other literature earlier in the century, 
see Hay, 'Moral Economy, Political Economy, and Law'. Erskine, who espoused so 
many popular causes in the courts, is a notable exception to much of the bar in this 
respect . The youngest son of the impecunious and Methodistical tenth earl of Buchan, 
he had experience as both a naval and army officer before coming to the bar, and it 
seems likely that this background fostered his own belief in the traditional measures: 
for Erskine's views and those of military men, see below  133, 156, 158. 
78 Townshend, Lives of Twelve Eminelll Judges, 66-73, 86-8. Some convictions of 
farmers under Restoration statutes for not using the Winchester bushel in measuring 
wheat came before him in 1782 and 1783. He expressed his annoyance in the latter 
case: 'I am sorry that the obstinacy of the farmers, in some parts of the Kingdom, 
has partly defeated the provisions of the statutes of Cha. II because, after the case of 
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juries in different counties, that the decision gave great satisfaction'. R. v. Major and 
R. v. Arnold, cited in Girdler, Observa1ions on Fores1alling, 119-22; R. v. Major (1792) 
4 Term Reports 750 (100 ER 1282); R. v. Arnold (1793) 5 Term Reports 353 ( 101 
ER 197). During periodsof dearth the relationship of customary to standard measures, 
which co-existed until the nineteenth century, was a sensitive one to suspicious 
consumers: see Thompson, 'Moral Economy'; Julian Hoppit, 'Reforming Britain's 
Weights and Measures, 1660-1824', Eng. Hist. Rev., cviii (1993); see Adrian Randall 
and Andrew Chqrlesworth (eds.), Markers, Market Culture and Popular Pro1es1 in 
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place in two important labour cases. The 1799 prosecution of 
Hammond and Webb, two shoemakers, was for a conspiracy 
carried on by the London journeymen against their masters to 
raise wages. Kenyon declared that conspiracies by masters were 
equally illegal and that they 'would become the objects of much 
severer punishment  than the poor journeymen': 
The law of England  held  the  balance  even, upon  the  scale of Justice, 
between  the rich and poor.  Those who were to administer  that justice, 
from their feelings as men, which he hoped he should always carry about 
him, were naturally  led to protect  the lower orders of the community, 
and who, some of them, had perhaps no other protection  than the Law. 
And he warned the journeymen that if conspiracies went unpun- 
ished, they would have to fear not only those of masters, but also 
those of middlemen: 'Suppose butchers were to combine to raise 
the price of meat, and farmers the price of corn'. The deluded 
journeymen were warned that if they had succeeded they would 
have laid 'the foundation for raising the price  of  corn, and the 
price of meat, as well as the price of all the articles of life, without 
many of which they could not exist'. In another case the same 
week, Kenyon warned the master ropemakers that a resolution 
they had made to hire only journeymen with discharges from 
their former masters was 'neither just nor legal': 'the men would 
thus become the slaves of the masters', and through such com- 
binations 'the country might be undone'. An attempt by Essex 
labourers to raise their wages in the dearth of 1800 through 
'Insurrection and Conspiracy', however, was denounced as a 
heinous offence bordering on high treason. The Times congratu- 
lated Kenyon, noting at the same time that 'his Lordship's 
decisions have alarmed all classes of regrators, and other such 
delinquents'. 79 
His belief that 'The Law' properly balanced the interests of all 
classes in the marketplace, his willingness to castigate conspirators 
and profiteers, and his particular concern for the poor were 
characteristic of his moralizing approach in the marketing cases 
also. Imagining a case in which ten wealthy men engrossed a 
town's supply of corn for a fortnight, he asked, in the final 
arguments on one of Waddington's  cases: 'Would not the poor 
 
79 Radical Politics and the Working M an in England, ser. 2, 'The Francis Place 
Collection in the British Library Department of Printed Books' (Harvester Microform 
edn, 1981), reel 23, set 39, 154, reports of 18, 23 Feb. 1799, probably from Morning 
Chron.; Times, 9, 13 Aug.  1800. I owe this information to Lynn MacKay. 
  
be starved, and would not the conduct of these monsters be 
contrary to law, to morality, and to religion?'  That many shared 
his moral revulsion was confirmed by his correspondence. Four 
days before final judgement on Waddington, a Doncaster evangel- 
ical clergyman wrote to compliment him on his assaults on sin, 
even among the great ones of the world: 
how wonderful are the dispensations of Providence - that He should 
raise up so noble an advocate to lead his cause . . . It is thro Him -you 
speak, act & think . . . I met with your speech on Mr Waddington 's 
business -it shot into my oppressed heart a beam of holy joy -& it is 
only right you should know you are not labouring in vain. 
'Marcus Aurelius' wrote from Bristol in praise of 'your protecting 
Care over the Cause of Religion and  Morality':  'continue  my 
Lord to snatch the poor and the distress'd from the Iron Fang of 
the Oppressor to make Vice tremble tho' shielded by Title 
Opulence & Power'. Samuel Glasse, the prominent evangelical 
cleric and magistrate, wrote to ask permission to dedicate a work 
on the ten commandments: 'Your Lordship's Pole-Star  of 
Direction in your judicial course is well known to be the Law of 
God as it is recognized by the Laws of our Country'. Glasse and 
William Mainwaring, who introduced the forestalling bill of 1797, 
were members of the Proclamation Society. Kenyon had been a 
member in its early years.80 
These letters, and their authors, are a reminder that Kenyon 's 
dislike of fraud, of the sins of the wealthy which hurt the poor, 
and of wickedness in general, was fortified by deep religious 
convictions shared by a wider educated public, perhaps particu- 
larly by evangelical gentlemen not convinced by new economic 
theory.81 Kenyon's own faith apparently became stronger in later 
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life. He was said never to have missed attending church in twenty- 
six years. 82 In 1800 he was an old man, almost seventy, and at 
the time of Waddington's second trial and judgements he was 
plunged in grief by a crisis which undoubtedly intensified his 
preoccupation with his faith. His beloved eldest son had become 
seriously ill in the spring of 1800, worsened while Kenyon was 
on the summer assize circuit, and died on 15 September.83 The 
intensity of his mourning, his own anticipation of death (he died 
in April 1802) and his sense of his Christian duty to the poor, 
help explain the strength of his certitude in the marketing cases. 
His language in the final arguments, two months after the death 
of his son, was often that of the biblical prophet: the regrator 
'sins against the moral feelings of men' and commits 'an immoral, 
a very immoral act'; laws must be 'not inconsistent with the laws 
of God';84 'we are objects of the constant attention of the benign 
Ruler of the Universe';85 'if  [Mr Waddington] can lay his hand 
upon his breast and say I am innocent -if his conscience acquits 
him, I hope he will meet with mercy at the tribunal of God!'86 
And he silenced Adam Smith with a greater text: 
When we were at Church last Sunday (I am a grave man, and I speak to 
grave men), we heard upon this subject the words of inspiration. "He", 
says the King of Israel, "who withholdeth corn, shall be cursed, and woe 
unto him that keepeth back bread from the people". 87 
But, of course, Kenyon did not rely only on scripture for preced- 
ent. He was, after all, Chief Justice of the common-law world. 
And he also had Thomas Erskine. 
Kenyon had made clear as early as February that he thought 
the common law provided ample powers, but he knew he would 
not have to hear final argument on the  law until Michaelmas 
term, in November, when Waddington would come up for judge- 
ment. He was clearly discussing the case with other judges, no- 
 
82 Townshend, Lives of  Twelve Eminent Judges,  116. 
83 Kenyon MSS, Diaries; Townshend, Lives of Twelve Eminent Judges, 114, misdates 
this 1801. 
84 Proceedings in the Cause the King v. Waddington, 76. 
85  Ibid., 5. 
86  Ibid., 6. 
87 Ibid ., 5. The passage is the only biblical reference to corn that was useful to 
Kenyon, but it also appears that he misquoted to the advantage of his own argument, 
as critics said he often did. In the King James version it reads : 'He that withholdeth 
corn, the people shall curse him: but blessing shall be upon the head of him that 
selleth it ' (Prov. 11:26). Blessing is not explicitly withheld from him that reselleth in 
the same market . 
  
tably Lawrence. What is more interesting is that he was in direct 
communication with the prosecution. Erskine had led for the 
prosecution on both informations against Waddington. His elo- 
quence had been sarcastic, disinterested, pathetic by turns, as he 
spoke of middlemen, the law and the poor. He had other advant- 
ages. He was believed to be the Chief Justice's favourite at the 
bar, while Law, counsel for Rushy and Waddington, emphatically 
was not. 88 In the arguments on Waddington's second conviction, 
Kenyon derided an assertion in Law's final address to the court: 
'There is no saying what you will not confidently contend, Mr 
Law'. 89 Henry Clifford, another of Waddington's lawyers, was 
notoriously an advanced Whig and a Catholic, and he had recently 
exchanged insults with Kenyon in another political case. Silenced 
by Kenyon in court, Clifford had then published a pamphlet 
reflecting on the Chief Justice's origins as a poor attorney. 90 
To these advantages Erskine added advocacy in private.  A 
letter he wrote to Kenyon on 15 October 1800, after the jury 
verdict in Worcester but before final judgement and before 
Waddington's second trial, shows that prosecuting counsel and 
judge had privately discussed the cases and continued to do so in 
the vacation. In the new term Kenyon would probably have to 
answer further arguments, as Waddington and Rusby's counsel 
were likely to move for a new trial or in arrest of judgement. 91 
Erskine's letter was in fact written a full six weeks before Kenyon 
gave final judgement against Waddington in King's Bench. 
Erskine was unequivocal. He alluded to Kenyon's rumoured 
retirement, trying to dissuade him, in part on grounds  that  he 
still had 'great duties to perform'.  These were made clear: 
You are perfectly right in the view you have taken of the evils arising 
from the high prices of provisions, and of the law which visits and corrects 
88 Townshend, Lives of Twelve Eminent Judges, 43, 54, 77; Campbell, Lives of the 
Chief Justices, iii, 133-4. 
89 Proceedings in the Cause the King v. Waddington, 71. 
90 'We seldom observe in our hereditary peers those pedantic notions of impractic- 
able morality, or that boisterous impetuosity of manners, which sometimes accompany 
and disgrace, even in the highest situations, those who have been raised to them from 
the desk, merely on account of their industry and professional success': Henry 
Clifford, Proceedings in the House of Lords in the Case of Benjamin Flower (1800), 
quoted in Townshend, Lives  of Twelve Eminent Judges, 58; Proceedings in the Cause 
the King  v.  Waddington, 41. Clifford was the nephew of Hugh, 4th Baron Clifford. 
91 They did so: Rusby's motion for a new trial was made  on  7 November  and 
argued 25 November; Waddington, whose counsel had given notice of a similar 
motion, waived the right on 20 November, but the court none the less heard counsel 
and treated it as a hearing for a new trial or in arrest of judgement. 
  
them. I have looked at the subject since we met, and am sure of what I 
say. The war, undoubtedly, and the vast circulation of paper, increases 
the public suffering; but, depend upon it, the whole system of trade in 
provisions has been entirely changed. There are now only great land- 
holders (the farmers) and great merchants with great capitals, in lines 
which were not formerly considered as the occupations of merchants. 
They sweep the whole country before them, in the purchase of the 
necessaries of life, and they command the markets. 
But Erskine did more than strongly reinforce Kenyon's moral 
condemnation of market conditions. He added: 
I have not found a case, almost, in which I have been consulted, that the 
common law will not reach; and perhaps that is one of the evils attending 
the repeal of the statutes; they served at once as helps and as qualifications 
of the common law, in cases where its principles might  have reached 
too far.92 
Erskine thus confirmed for Kenyon that the doctrine  to which 
he was so attracted on the grounds of tradition, paternalism and 
religious conviction was also, without question, good law. If, by 
October, Erskine wondered whether the powers of the common 
law were perhaps too wide (he had made the opposite argument 
in February),93 that was a question of public policy, and Kenyon 
had his own decided views on that. 
There is some surviving evidence of the arguments that Kenyon 
and his brother judges found most compelling, although they did 
not feel it necessary or relevant to reproduce them all in court. 94 
Kenyon's last public words on Rushy were cast entirely in terms 
of the dating and definition of the term 'ingrosser' as found in 
the standard legal texts. He concluded: 'Finding these authorities 
I cannot on the ground of any abstract reasoning say that regrating 
is not an offence at Common Law'.95 Yet sometime in the later 
months of 1800 and early 1801 the judges of King's Bench also 
privately considered the 'abstract reasoning' of Smith and Burke 
 
 
92 'Thomas Erskine to Kenyon, 15 Oct. 1800', HM C K enyon, 544 no. 1418; Kenyon 
MSS, HMC Calendared, no. 1418. 
93 Times, 10 Feb. 1800. 
94 Lincoln's Inn Library, London, Dampier MSS, L.P.B. 339a. This bundle  of 
papers once belonged to Sir Soulden Lawrence, a puisne judge of King's Bench when 
Waddington and Rusby were tried, and appear to be in his hand. Lawrence took 
some of the depositions in the Kent prosecution (e.g., PRO, KB 1130, Hilary 1800, 
deposition of Peter Broadley et al., Thomas Ellis, 5-6 Feb. 1800). I wish  to thank 
the Honourable Treasurer and Benchers of Lincoln's Inn for permission to use and 
quote from these papers. 
95 In what appears to be the ruling on the motion for arrest of judgement , argued 
31 January 1801. 
  
and Law with some care, in a series of memoranda  on markets 
and market  theory. 96 
They were not impressed. Was the market too big for concerted 
conspiracy? No: 'corresponding societies shew how easy [is] com- 
munication'. Were middlemen necessary to prevent famine? 
Surely scarcity alone would raise the price sufficiently to ration 
supply, without their machinations. Farmers had to come to 
market and the price then was a fair one; the ingrosser had no 
such compulsion, but could hold back what he had paid less for, 
forcing the price to rise. When the price was set by buyers free 
not to buy and sellers free not to sell, the market might work; 
when buyers had to buy from sellers not obliged to  sell,  the 
market failed. The price would be fair only when production was 
'not fraudulently lessened by corn kept back'. And combination 
was not an imaginary possibility: Mark Lane 'regulates the whole 
kingdom'.  The arguments of Smith applied to the whole market, 
if at all, but forestalling and regrating might 'hurt the inhabitants 
of a  particular place'. In the margin of Smith's argument that 
'those who may be hindered from supplying themselves on that 
market day, may supply themselves as cheap on another', is 
written the query, 'What are they [to] do in the mean time? Eat 
they  must'. 
The judges clearly relied on the current pamphlet debate for 
critiques of Smith.97 The claim that 'trade will find its level' did 
not apply to limited goods with a fixed level of consumption, or 
where the seller controlled the buyer, or where the good was an 
absolute necessity, all of which applied to corn. Buckles, buttons, 
ribbons and clothes were one kind of good; corn was emphatically 
of a different kind. And since hackney coaches, interest rates and 
wages  of  journeymen  were  all  regulated,  why  should  not  the 
 
96 There is a summary of Smith's defence of corn merchants in Wealth of Nations, 
some passages from Burke's Thoughts on Scarcity, and references to some of the 
arguments produced by counsel. The following  passages are all found in Lincoln's 
Inn Lib., Dampier MSS, L.P.B. 339a, which is not paginated. Whether Lawrence's 
summaries were the basis of the conclusions of all four judges is not clear. Kenyon's 
own correspondence and public utterances do not suggest a knowledgeable or sophist- 
icated view of markets: it seems likely that he relied upon Lawrence's conclusions 
without following his reasoning in detail. 
97 One of the memoranda, after the summary of Smith's argument, abstracts [Sir 
William Young], Corn Trade: An Examination of Certain Commercial Principles in their 
Application to Agriculture and the Corn Trade (London, 1800), which called for the 
restoration of statute law to reach not only the 'petty forestaller' but also great 
wholesalers. 
  
market in corn be regulated also -'if it be necessary some times 
to interfere the general rule can hold'? Smith had admitted that 
'the real monopolist' wicked enough to raise prices by false 
alarms, combination or undue means undoubtedly  could  exist, 
and Burke appeared to admit that fraud could infect even  the 
corn market. 98 
Dismissing political economy, Kenyon and the other judges 
dealt also with another defence: that criminal acts should be 
shown to be the result of criminal intent and have harmful con- 
sequences. The judges appear to have concluded that the repealed 
statute of Edward VI made clear that the offence was criminal, 
'without any consideration of intent and effect', and that  that 
statute was simply declaratory of the common law. 99 In the end, 
unconvinced by the new economics, believing that a large body 
of old statute and case law showed that the acts themselves had 
always been deemed criminal, and persuaded to a moral certainty 
that profit-taking in times of famine was wicked in the eyes of 
the law and God, Kenyon and his brother judges found the 
convictions of Rushy and Waddington to be sound in law and 
policy. Pitt might tell the House (as he did on the opening of 
parliament, 11 November 1800) that the system of market regula- 
tion of 500 years ago was irrelevant and dangerous, 100 but the 
judges would decide the matter. 
In resisting parliamentary opinion, Kenyon may have sensed 
that he had important constitutional support. Kenyon held George 
III in the very highest esteem. 101 On 27 November, the day before 
Kenyon passed judgement on Waddington, Lady Kenyon had an 
audience with the king, who received her kindly and expressed 
concern  for  her  safety  in  travelling  home  to  Shropshire  for 
98 One of the summaries quotes Burke, Thoughts and Details on Scarcity, 21; the 
word  'fraud' is twice underlined. 
99 Lincoln's Inn Lib., Dampier MSS, L.P.B. 339a, on a single sheet of rough notes 
dealing with these two issues; also in the bundle is a copy of the information in the 
Kent prosecution of Waddington, in which the passages referring to intent  and to 
consequences are all underlined. 
100 He also allowed that it might be unwise 'to be guided solely by speculative 
systems of political economy', but his biographer a few years later noted that in his 
speech 'he displayed notions of political economy not less correct than those which 
he manifested on matters of legislation and government': John Gifford, A History of 
the Political Life . . . of William Pitt, 6 vols. (London, 1809), vi, 525-9. 
101 He eulogized the king in addresses to grand juries, sometimes concluding with 
a quotation from scripture: 'Our good King may say with Samuel of old, "Whose ox 
have I taken? Whose ass have I taken? Whom have I defrauded?" ' (I Sam. 12:3): 
Townshend, Lives of Twelve Eminent Judges, 113. 
  
Christmas. But the king also had a message for the Chief Justice: 
he 'said he [Lord Kenyon] was doing all he could to keep these 
forestallers in order, and thought they would feel it; seemed 
pleased with what he had done about Waddington'. 102 If Kenyon 
had any doubts about the wisdom of confirming judgement against 
Waddington, the king's clear approval the day before must have 
been decisive. 
E. P. Thompson's dichotomy between 'traditionalists' and 
'economists' on the issue of regulating markets in food is fully 
illustrated in the marketing cases. Certainly between Burke and 
Kenyon, or Law and Erskine, ·there was no mere difference of 
emphasis, no mere argument within the structure of the new 
economics, but a moral and empirical gulf that seemed in 1800 
unlikely to be bridged. 103 Kenyon, and other judges like Hotham, 
Graham and Grose certainly spoke like traditionalists, using in 
public comment almost entirely moral arguments; their references 
to political economy were either simple denigrations or criticisms 
of its speculative excesses. 104 To a lawyer of Kenyon's deep 
religious views, Burke must have seemed not only mistaken and 
hard-hearted, but also blasphemous, when he wrote, in words 
widely reprinted in 1800, of 'the laws of commerce, which are 
the laws of nature, and consequently the laws of God'. 105  The 
Chief Justice knew a different truth: 'Our [common] law, thank 
God, is the same with the divine'. 106 
 
 
102 'Mary, Lady Kenyon to her sisters, 29 Nov. [1800]', in HM C Kenyon, 558 no. 
1429; Kenyon MSS, no. 1429, reporting an audience of Thursday (27 Nov.). In HM C 
Kenyon it is dated 1801, although the contents make clear that it was written before 
final judgement; no date appears on the manuscript letter which also contains the 
remarks about Lady Kenyon's trip. Kenyon passed judgement on Waddington, thus 
confirming the verdict of the jury, on 28 November: see Proceedings in the Cause the 
King v. Waddington, 6. For other comments on Waddington in Lady Kenyon's letter 
not published in HM C Kenyon, see below; for his relations with George III, see 
Kenyon, Life  of Kenyon, 281-3. 
103 See above, text at n. 21. 
104 I have not been able to establish whether Mr Justice Lawrence, the apparent 
author of the private criticisms of Smith cited above, made similar arguments in public. 
105 Burke,  Thoughts and Details  on Scarcity, 32. 
106 Proceedings in the Cause the King v. Waddington, 5, after arguments on the motion 
for arrest of judgement in the Worcester prosecution. On the role of scripture in 
judicial rhetoric and as a source of law, see Douglas Hay, 'The Laws of God and the 
Laws of Man: Lord George Gordon and the Death Penalty', in John Rule and Robert 
Malcolmson (eds.), Protest and Survival: The Historical Experience: Essays for E. P. 
Thompson (London,  1993), 95ff. 
  
IV 
ORDER, PROPERTY, LAW 
Most of the other eleven common-law judges supported Kenyon's 
interpretation, but not all shared his moralizing outlook. To 
explain the near-unanimity of the bench in 1800 in the face of 
leading parliamentary opinion, and their subsequent lack of agree- 
ment, we must consider the implications of an issue that probably 
mattered most in the end. From September 1800, the duke of 
Portland and others in government had been stressing the sanctity 
of private property. 107 In his last argument before Lord Kenyon, 
Law made the point: 
Will the law dispossess the man who requires the terms of his property? 
Will it punish him as an extortioner, for so doing? No . . . it has not yet 
been contended that every man has not a right to put his own price, at 
least, upon his own land, and the uses thereof . . . Instances like these 
must strike at the root and foundation of all property, and every right of 
the free controul and disposition in respect of the same. It strikes equally 
at the foundation and free rights of property, thus to question this gentle- 
man with Hops. 108 
Waddington himself made the same point to the public. 109 
The first answer from the judges was that property presumed 
a prior social good: order. The public-order argument had been 
in Kenyon's mind for years as a justification that transcended (or 
at least strongly qualified) all quibbles about such issues as the 
status of hops in the common law, let alone the theories of Smith. 
In  the  first,  preliminary  hearing   of  Waddington's   case,  on 
8 February  1800, Kenyon observed: 
A few years ago it became my duty to state to a Grand Jury, that 
Forestalling was clearly an offence at Common Law; and if I had not done 
so, I do not know what would have been the consequence. When I went 
to Oxford corn was dear, the people threatened  an insurrection, and the 
whole country was alarmed. I stated what the law was, and the punishment 
that awaited those who were guilty of this offence. When the people knew 
there was a law to  resort to, it composed their minds, and  the alarm 
ceased. This is a thing most essential to the existence of the country. 110 
 
107 Wells, Wretched Faces, 238. 
108 Proceedings in the Cause the King v. Waddington, 70-1, moving from the argument 
that it is lawful to charge for easements over land for the transport of coal, thus 
increasing the price of a necessity, to the analogy of foodstuffs. On the property issue, 
see also Hont and lgnatieff, 'Needs and Justice in the Wealth of Nations', 14. 
109 Summary of the Trial, vi. 
110 Times, 10 Feb. 1800 (hearing for rule nisi). Kenyon was on the Oxford circuit 
in 1795, but he conflates a sequence. The press accounts suggest that at Oxford, faced 
with riot, he urged only repression; it was not until he arrived at Shrewsbury that he 
/com. on p. 139) 
  
This conviction, that promulgation of the existence of the offences 
of forestalling, regrating and engrossing was essential for pacify- 
ing the mob, undoubtedly owed something to Kenyon's discus- 
sions with country magistrates. 111 From many accounts of food 
riots, and encounters between rioters and gentlemen, we know 
that the restoration of public order depended largely on the ability 
of JPs to convince rioters that something would be done. As 
'Governor' Thomas Pownall put it in 1795, the people would be 
'patient' and 'peaceable' if justices were seen to be acting; other- 
wise, there  would be 'insurgent demands of redress' , which like 
hammered steel would acquire 'a temper of resistance and recoil, 
which will not and cannot by any force be kept down . . . the 
people in their hunger will not perceive that they are doing 
wrong'. It was thus imperative that steps be taken to deal with 
forestalling. 112 By far the easiest response  was to promise, and 
perhaps carry out, a few prosecutions of middlemen. This was 
self-evident to judges earlier in the century. Sir Thomas Parker, 
Chief Baron of the Court of Exchequer, wrote to his brother on 
King's Bench, Sir John Eardley Wilmot,  during the great riots 
of 1756: 
none of the Rioters were Indicted before me at Stafford, so that all the 
Service I could do my Country was to endeavour to prevent such disturb- 
ances for the future, by declaring in my Charge what  remedy the Law 
had provided against Engrossing, and the other abuses complained of, if 
they were really aggrieved, but I repeated to make the better impression, 
that Outrage and  Violence were not to be endured under any  pretext 
whatsoever .113 
As the marquis of Buckingham observed to Kenyon, just after 
Rusby's conviction, Buckingham's own conviction of Battams in 
1796 'operated much on the minds of our lower people, who 
during the present calamity have not shewn the slightest 
discontent'. 114 
The restoration  of order was of urgent  concern to thousands 
f n. 110 cone. ) 
began to speak of forestallers. See Berrow's Worcester Ji, 23 July, 13 Aug. 1795; also 
above, text at n. 36. 
111 Reflecting  upon  another  case,  he noted,  'we had  an opportunity  of  knowing 
from the grand juries in different counties, that the decision gave great satisfaction': 
R. v. M ajor, R. v. Arnold, cited in Girdler, Observations on Forestalling,  119-22. 
112 Thomas Pownall, Considerations on the Scarcity and High Price s of Bread-Corn 
and Bread at the Mark et (Cambridge,1795 ), 10, 50, 53. 
113 Sir  Thomas  Parker  to Sir John  Eardley  Wilmot,  Park  Hall  (Staffs.), 7 Sept. 
1756: Beinecke Library, Yale University, Osborne Lee papers, Osborne files. 
114 Above, n. 43. 
  
of country magistrates while Kenyon was hearing the marketing 
cases in King's Bench. The largest and most violent food riots of 
the entire century took place during these months115 and the 
desperate correspondence received by the Home Secretary was 
undoubtedly paralleled by equally desperate direct appeals to the 
judges when they met their grand jurors on circuit. Food prices 
were so high that forty per cent of the population in the Midlands 
could not have bought enough bread to survive even if they had 
spent the entire family income on nothing else. 116 Doctors warned 
of epidemic disease, but magistrates warned of desperation, and, 
increasingly, insurrection.  Their paternalism  and their attempts 
to restore public order were inextricably entwined. The Revd 
Alexander Bunn Haden, the most energetic Staffordshire magis- 
trate, despaired by May 1800 of effective parliamentary action 
against cheating millers. He appealed to the Home Secretary: 
As a Conservator of the Peace, I shall always stand forward to protect it: 
but I never can attempt it, at the hazard of my Life, for the enriching of 
one part of the Community & supporting them in the most glaring Act 
of Oppression at the Expence of the Comforts, Happiness & even the 
Existence of the Other. 
He cited instances of farmers withholding supplies, relying on 
their armed force in the Association Movement to suppress riot, 
and millers who engrossed and doubled the price of wheat that 
Haden himself had had sold at an affordable price. 117 A spirited 
correspondence ensued, in which Haden stood by his comments 
on market prices in the face of increasingly sharp admonitions 
from the Home Secretary to protect the property of millers and 
farmers. By October 1800, Haden was apologizing for the 
strength of his criticisms of farmers and middlemen ('Your Grace, 
no doubt, has the best Information on the Subject'), but he would 
admit no more than 'I am satisfied that the high price of Grain 
is not entirely owing to the cause [Combination] I have attributed 
it'.118  Magistrates doubted the policy of freeing markets from 
 
115 See Wells, Wretched Faces, passim . 
116 Douglas Hay, 'War, Dearth and Theft in the Eighteenth  Century: The Record 
of the English Courts', Past  and Present, no. 95 (May  1982), 129-32. 
117 Revd Alexander Bunn Haden to Portland, Bilston, 10, 16 May  1800: PRO, HO 
42/50, fos. 48-9. See also Aris ' Birmingham Gaz., 3 June 1795, for Haden's activity 
that year. 
118 Revd Alexander Bunn Haden to Portland, Bilston (Staffs.), 27 Sept. 1800: PRO, 
HO 42/51, fos. 609-10; Haden to Portland, Bilston, 2 Oct. 1800: PRO, HO 42/52, 
fos. 421-2; Portland to Haden, 14 May 1800: PRO, HO 43/ 11, fos. 485-7; Portland 
to Haden, 30 Sept.  1800: PRO, HO 43112, fos.  194-6. 
 
 
 
 
  
controls, but they also doubted their ability to maintain order, 
faced with the most massive riots of the century, without lawful 
powers to control market abuses or at least promise to do so. By 
the summer of 1801, Haden was desperately demanding troops: 
'nine-tenths of the inhabitants are of the lowest Class . . . in case 
a Riot should break out in the dead of the Night . . . what is to 
become of me, my Family and Property during the long interval 
that must take place before the soldiers can arrive?' 119 
Kenyon's reanimation of the common-law offences was very 
popular with many country and borough magistrates who thought 
in these terms. When the first conviction of Waddington was 
achieved at Worcester at the end of July 1800, Kenyon brought 
the good news to them as quickly as possible. He was sitting at 
assizes at Chelmsford and an express rushed the verdict to him 
from Worcester, so that he could inform the Essex grand jury 
that 'a most respectable jury' of the county of Worcester had 
found Waddington guilty on every count. 120 Inthe months follow- 
ing, local prosecution initiatives proliferated, at both the county 
and borough levels. At Oxford, for example, influential citizens 
suggested petitioning parliament for legislation to punish the 
marketing offences summarily, and the county justices suggested 
similar legislation to deal with frauds by mealmen and bakers. 
Oxford City Council announced a subscription to prosecute 
offenders and offered a reward, advertising these decisions by 
handbills and instructing the mayor to employ informers in the 
city markets. In Nottingham (where there were intense food riots 
in September), resolutions of local gentlemen and farmers called 
for action against profiteers and a new statute; there were similar 
resolutions at Chesterfield, Kidderminster and Worcester; an 
association to prosecute profiteers was formed in Middlesex. 121 
Kenyon was aware of the realities and the dangers of massive 
public  disorder  in  London.  In November,  shortly  before  the 
119 Haden to Portland, Bilston, 31 July 1801: PRO, HO 42/62, fos. 326-7. I am 
indebted to Malcolm Thomas of Friends' House Library, London, for this and other 
material from PRO, HO 42. 
120 Summary  of the Trial, 92. It was in fact a city jury  (Worcester city held its own 
assizes), before whom Waddington had doubted he would receive a fair trial. 
121 Nottingham J I, 6 Sept. 1800; Wells, Insurrection, 45; Chesterfield resolutions, 8 
Sept. 1800; also Middlesex resolutions, 23 Sept. 1800: PRO, HO 42/51, fos. 406-9; 
similarly, Kidderminster, 15 Sept., Worcester, 10 Oct. 1800: PRO, HO 42/52; Oxford 
Council Acts, 1752-1801, ed. Hobson, 276-7 (3 Sept. 1800); Jackson's Oxford JI, 27 
Sept., 15 Nov. 1800. I owe these latter references to Wendy Thwaites. In general, 
see PRO, HO 42/51-2. 
  
judgement on Waddington, Lady Kenyon wrote from London to 
her son about a threatened riot on Kennington common, but felt 
confident that the authorities were alert. 122 Perhaps she and 
Kenyon were also reassured by the six huge blunderbusses that 
the Chief Justice had ordered the year before from Mssrs Boulton 
and Watt of Birmingham. 123 But Kenyon's conviction, that estab- 
lishing a modern precedent would lead to the restoration of public 
order, had already been called into serious question by the unex- 
pected consequences of Rusby's conviction for regrating in early 
July 1800, the first case tried by the Chief Justice. 
The special jury in Rusby's case were twelve merchants, a fact 
that Kenyon made much of at a later stage of the case. 124 The 
evidence was conflicting as to whether Rushy indeed had resold 
oats, as charged in the indictment, but Kenyon disparaged the 
awkward testimony, suggesting perjury, and gave a virtual 
instruction to convict. He invited the jury to imagine the extreme 
case: 'Suppose a rich man were to be placed at every avenue of 
this town, who was to purchase up every article of provisions 
destined for the supply of the metropolis, and to sell the articles 
so purchased from hand to hand, increasing the price at every 
sale, what, in that case, would become of the poor consumer? 
This is an evil of an alarming magnitude, and every exertion to 
stem the torrent, in courts of justice, must be highly beneficial'. 
The Times, in its report, quoted Kenyon as explicitly calling for 
the jurors  to establish a 'precedent' to end the afflictions of the 
poor. It is not surprising that they 'almost instantly' found Rushy 
guilty.12s 
Very  high   prices   continued   through   the   summer.   On 
15 September, a mob organized through handbills hissed and 
shoved and threw mud at the mealmen going into the corn market 
122 Lady Kenyon to the Hon. George Kenyon, London, 10 Nov. [1800]: Kenyon 
MSS, box 24. 
123 'deadly instruments each capable of killing 50 men at a shot (more I believe 
than his Lordship's mouth ever sent from this world at one judgement . . . )': M. R. 
Boulton to James Watt, 4 Feb. 1799: Birmingham City Archives, Boulton and Watt 
Collection, parcel B. 
124 On the proceedings in a motion for a new trial, 24 November, see Bell's Weekly 
Messenger, 30 Nov. 1800. 
125  Times, 5 July 1800, quotes Kenyon in his peroration blaming jobbers not simply 
for an increase in price, but an increase of 50 per cent. On receiving the verdict, 
Kenyon invited the prosecutors of Rushy to proceed against his partner Smith on the 
basis of the evidence Smith had given in Rusby's defence, that he had been the one 
who had resold the oats. Kenyon MSS, nisi prius from 4 July to 3 December 1800; 
Bell's  Weekly M essenger, 6 July 1800; date of trial given as 4 June in error. 
  
at Mark Lane. The Lord Mayor came to reason with the crowd, 
but eventually read the Riot Act when they began throwing stones 
and brickbats at the constables. Finally, after sporadic attacks on 
bakers' shops, the mob went at midnight to the house of Rushy 
and entirely gutted it, as the property of the man who had been 
marked out and convicted before the  Chief Justice as a social 
enemy. It was already clear to critics of Kenyon that his words 
had exposed many dealers to grave danger and given enormous 
encouragement  to the mob. 126 
Two months later, Law, acting for Rushy, moved for a new 
trial on the grounds that several counts in the indictment had not 
been proved. In his address to the court, he made much of 'the 
sufferings of the defendant in consequence of the popular clamour 
against   him'. 127    The  arguments  on   the   motion   were   heard 
24 November and, when Law again referred to the 'lawless 
violence' from which Rushy had suffered at the  hands  of  the 
mob, Kenyon (who said he was ignorant of these acts) promised 
the fullest punishment for any of the rioters who had taken 
advantage of Rusby's conviction; however, he stated in the most 
unequivocal terms that he agreed with the verdict, found by the 
twelve merchants, 'men of great understanding and undoubted 
integrity'. And he repeated his sentiments that, although com- 
merce was the 'very pillar of the state', 'Free Commerce -Free 
Commerce! was a very captivating expression' that could not be 
allowed to justify rich men perverting the markets to the misery 
of the poor. Justices Grose and LeBlanc concurred in the refusal 
of a new trial. 128 
At this point, Law abandoned any attempt to convert the judges 
to political economy and opened a new argument on what he 
termed 'merely . . . a dry question of law'. No evidence could be 
found of a prosecution for regrating (buying and selling on the 
same day, in the same market or one nearby), before the statute 
126 'Chronicle' (14 Sept.), in Annual Register, xiii (1800), 33ff.; letter from Harvey 
Christian Coombe, Lord Mayor of London, 19 Sept. 1800: PRO, HO 42/51, fo. 284; 
also in the same volume, Fitzwilliam to Portland, Wentworth, 3 Sept. 1800: fos. 6-11; 
Revd David Hughes to Portland, Temple House, 19 Sept. 1800: fos. 197-8; Wells, 
Wretched Faces, 128ff. An extraordinary instance of the danger of encouraging the 
mob was reported after the 1796 attack on the king: a man was prosecuted at Lewes 
assizes for saying, 'Damn the King; I wish they had stoned him to death -he is a 
monopolizer, and a forestaller, and I wish his head on Temple Bar': M anchester Gaz., 
6 Aug. 1796. 
127 Bell's  Weekly Messenger, 9 Nov.  1800. 
128  Times, 26 Nov.  1800; Bell's  Weekly Messenger, 30 Nov.  1800. 
  
of Edward VI, and that had been repealed in 1772. That is, the 
offence of regrating was not an offence at common law. On this, 
Kenyon granted him a rule to show cause why the judgement 
should not be arrested. 129 But where had the courts arrived at by 
this point, in terms of public policy rather than 'dry questions of 
law?' For it would be surprising, in view of what has been 
revealed about the cases, if the judges were thinking of nothing 
but old precedents in deciding Rusby's case. There was, in fact, 
a gradually dawning realization that two practical problems 
resulted from the policy of the court. 
Law emphasized one of them in increasingly lurid detail. If the 
provisions of the statute of 6 Edward VI were carried out, 'this 
great and populous city must become a desert; all large aggregate 
bodies of people, wherever collected, must disperse, and betake 
themselves to the woods and fields, and seek their immediate 
nourishment like the other live stock upon the farm, and from 
the  very  soil  which  produces  it.  If the  common  law  be  the 
perfection  of reason, can this be common law?' 13° Kenyon dis- 
missed the argument that Londoners would starve if middlemen 
were banished: 'I say that it is not warranted'. But the argument 
was in fact a potentially crucial one, and Law pressed it again 
when Waddington's second trial came on a few weeks later: 
middlemen were indispensable to unite in one market distant 
producers with London consumers. 131 
Meanwhile, some counsel were becoming aware of unintended 
consequences of the prosecutions. 132 The attack on Rusby's prop- 
erty showed that Kenyon's unnuanced hostility to all middlemen 
was, in its enthusiasm and venom, having the opposite effects on 
popular opinion to those that had been envisaged. Rather  than 
calming the mob by showing that the law was active, Kenyon's 
rhetoric was greeted by the poor of London as yet another genteel 
sanction for the food riot. The September attack on Rushy was 
now followed, in December, by extremely widespread rioting in 
London, the most serious food riots in the capital in the eighteenth 
 
129 Bell's Weekly Messenger, 30 Nov. 1800; Times, 28 Nov. 1800 (reporting 27 Nov.). 
130 Proceedings in the Cause the King v. Waddington, 2-3, 62-3; Summary of the 
Trial, 36, 50; Trial against Samuel Ferrand Waddington, 139. 
131 Times, 9 Dec. 1800. Law may have been aware that traders at Mark Lane had 
communicated their alarm about their personal security to the Lord Mayor and the 
Home Secretary: letter by Harvey Christian Coombe, Lord Mayor of London, 6 Oct. 
1800: PRO, HO 42/52, fo.  163. 
132 Proceedings in the Cause the King v. Waddington, 4 (comments of Garrow). 
  
century. They began within a week of Waddington's conviction 
before Kenyon for the Kent offence. 
Through these later months of 1800, although the king may 
have supported  Kenyon's position, criticism of the Lord Chief 
Justice, both in private and in public, mounted. His 'exultation' 
at convictions, his ignorance and prejudices, were increasingly 
blamed for the riots and attacks on property, and for the 'mon- 
strous and cruel usage' of men like Rusby. Certainly the mob 
claimed his sanction: they papered inflammatory handbills on the 
Monument; they painted walls with slogans, 'No hoarders -no 
grinders of the poor -Lord Kenyon, and down with the meal- 
men'; and they sang ballads in honour of him. Kenyon, his critics 
said, incited disorder and wakened oppressive doctrines, so that 
the common law seemed an 'incomprehensible, unknown, 
undefined but superior power' waiting to punish  acts,  'which 
have been proclaimed aloud, by the omnipotent voice of 
Parliament, to be the only genuine and true sources of national 
prosperity and commercial greatness'. Richard Brinsley Sheridan 
publicly criticized the Lord Chief Justice; there was talk of 
impeachment. The duke of Portland privately deplored the pop- 
ular ignorance and violence encouraged by 'the indiscreet & ever 
to be lamented doctrines which were promulgated from the Bench 
in the course of the Assizes'. J. Symonds, professor of modern 
history  at  Cambridge,  attributed  some  of  the  rioting  to  'the 
intemperate language so extra-judicially used'. 133 
The  Lords'  committee  investigating    dearth   reported   on 
15 December, the day that the London riots broke out, that they 
had not found anything but normal and laudable dealings by 
dealers. 134 Yet Kenyon and his brother judges did not initially 
draw  back.  In  late  January  and  early  February   1801,  when 
133 Kenyon, Life of Kenyon, 372; Fitzwilliam to Portland, 3 Sept. 1800: PRO, HO 
42/51, fos. 6-11; John Graves Simcoe, 27 Mar. 1801: PRO, HO 42/61, fos. 351-3; 
'Chronicle', in Annual Register, xiii (1800), 212; [Sir Thomas Turton], An Address to 
the Good Sense and Candour of the People, in Behalf of the Dealers in Corn: With Some 
Few Observations on a Late Trial for Regrating, by a  Country  Gentleman  (London, 
1800; internal date of 30 Sept. 1800), 13, 15, 18, 136-7, 152; Portland to Henry 
Dundas, 12 Oct. 1800: Nottingham University, Portland MSS, PwV 111; Wells, 
Wretched Faces, 245; Autobiography of Arthur Young, ed. M. B. Edwards (London, 
1898), 344-5. Turton's lengthy pamphlet is a full defence of the wisdom of Smith 
and Burke, of the 1772 repeal and of the injured innocence of Rushy; the evidence, 
logic, and justice against his conviction is examined in detail in a very explicit critique 
of Kenyon's conduct of the case. There was a second edition later that year. 
134 Second Report, Lords Committee to Consider the Dearth of Provisions: Ordered to 
be Printed  15th December  1800 (London, 1800), 21-2. 
  
Waddington was finally sentenced on his two convictions, the 
judges still were determined to castigate speculators. But they 
faced a delicate balancing of priorities. They wanted to make an 
example with a severe sentence (to deter others), yet in terms 
that would meet the objections of those who said that such 
prosecutions were an interference with property. Moreover, they 
needed to do so without further encouraging the poor to take 
matters into their own hands. In particular, they had to ensure 
that the provisioning of London was  not interrupted by mob 
action. 
 
v 
WHY  WADDINGTON? 
The warning  to the mob, and the justification for interference 
with markets and property, were entwined in the sentence passed 
on Waddington on 28 January 1801 for the Worcester offence. 
By sending Waddington to prison for a month  (he had already 
been there for many weeks) and fining him £500, Mr Justice 
Grose, who had been one of Kenyon's most enthusiastic sup- 
porters, emphasized the importance of the precedent now firmly 
established on the common law found 'in our ablest Reporters 
and Commentators'. 135 The security of property and commerce, 
far from being threatened by the judges, was a value to which 
they had sacrificed human lives: 
God forbid this Court should do any thing which interferes with the legal 
freedom of trade! In support of this, the Law has declared that to violate 
the freedom of trade by intercepting commodities in their way to the 
market, taking them from the owners by force, or obliging the owners to 
accept a less price than that at which they were willing to sell them, and 
carrying them away against their will, or committing like violence on the 
owners in the market, is a capital offence, for which men have forfeited 
their lives to the Law. 
This reference to capital convictions and executions was both a 
warning to would-be rioters and a justification for the doctrine 
on markets: 
The Law, therefore, so far protects the freedom of trade, as it encourages 
men to bring their goods to market; and punishes those who by acts of 
135 Trial against Samuel Ferrand Waddington, 186. While in prison Waddington was 
said to have sold a ton of potatoes daily, and 'appropriated the proceeds to the benefit 
of his poorer fellow prisoners': T. C.  Turberville, Worcestershire in the Nineteenth 
Century (London,  1852), 111. 
  
violence would deter them from doing so. The same Law, which protects 
the rich against the violence of the poor, also protects the poor  man 
against the avarice of the rich. And from all time it has been the object 
of the Law to prevent the enhancement of the price of  merchandise 
coming to market, and peculiarly the price of the necessaries of life, for 
the purpose of enriching a single individual. 136 
The judges thus constructed their final argument not out of law, 
but out of natural justice, a common-law kind of equity. 137 The 
argument  that  hangings  could  be  avoided  through  controls 
on freedom of trade was a familiar one to country gentlemen. 138 
Two  weeks  later,  sentencing  Waddington  for  the  second 
offence, Grose remarked on 'the speculations of gamblers, . . . 
the avarice of the rich', and 'the apathy of those who wrapped 
up in themselves, were forgetful of the relative duties they owed 
to their  fellow-creatures'.  He also adverted  to 'the merciless 
quality of the crime'. 139  He seemed to journalists  'extremely 
anxious' to impress Waddington with his guilt, and passed a 
sentence of another £500 fine and another three months imprison- 
ment, to commence at the expiration of his first sentence. 140 The 
heavy sentence appears to have been based not only on what 
Waddington did in Kent and Worcester. 
For Waddington was a Jacobin. He had been expelled from 
the Surrey troop of light horse for his radical politics and had 
attacked Burke in print for  slandering the  French and their 
revolution. Kenyon emphasized several times in the case that he 
did not know Waddington (although he admitted to knowing his 
family). 141 It is likely that the entire bench knew of Waddington's 
notoriety. Certainly by June 1800 they had had direct evidence 
of his politics, because his Appeal to the British Hop Planters had 
a passage attacking the war with France (an 'ensanguined field, 
reeking with the blood of thousands - PREMATURELY 
SLAIN!'),  and  another  denouncing  the  'dignified  orders'  of 
 
136 Trial against Samuel Ferrand Waddington, 186-7. 
137 Atiyah's use of the outcome of the cases as illustrations of this tendency in 
eighteenth-century law, including private law, is thus only  part of the story. The 
judges' own justification is presented explicitly in such terms. 
138 Buckingham, in his letter of 8 July 1800, noted that he had prosecuted Thomas 
Battams after dealing with rioters 'whose lives would have been forfeited, if they had 
been prosecuted for the heavy offence of plundering the corn-waggons': Buckingham 
to Kenyon, Stowe, 8 July 1800: Kenyon MSS, box 23; Kenyon, Life of Kenyon, 374-6. 
139 Times, 12 Feb. 1801. 
140 Bell's  Weekly Messenger, 15 Feb.  1801. 
141 Times, 21 Nov. 1800. Actually, Kenyon only said that, to the best of his 
knowledge, 'I have never seen his person before', a rather different claim. 
  
England: 'Degen'rate sons! of Britain's fall'n race I Honor's dis- 
honor, and Fame's last disgrace!' 
By November the judges were even angrier. Waddington's 
Summary of his trial, his appeal to public opinion over the court, 
compared witnesses against him to spies in 'the old regime of 
France' 142, and compared Kenyon's behaviour to the most polit- 
ical and oppressive acts of Lord Mansfield, bolstering the argu- 
ment with a long quotation from the notorious libel on that Chief 
Justice by Junius. 143 In court, Waddington argued on his own 
behalf at one point, citing to Kenyon a defence of Horne Tooke, 
who in a famous action ten years before had humiliated Kenyon 
in open court. 144 And Waddington published yet another attack 
on the court while he was waiting for judgement. 
Such effrontery received the treatment it deserved. Lady 
Kenyon reported to the family: 
Lord Kenyon has sent my Geo.[Kenyon] a paper to see a very Impudent 
advertizement Waddington has published since he was Confined, which I 
fancy he will repent for they have delayed giving judgement till next term 
that he may have leisure during his imprisonment to consider & humble[?] 
his Tone of thinking and acting. 145 
Waddington's politics probably added extra edge to Kenyon's 
distaste for the man. 146 But the issue of politics was more than a 
personal one. Erskine and another of the prosecution  lawyers 
made glancing reference to Waddington's evil motives and private 
life, demanding an exemplary punishment. 147  This was probably 
a reference to the belief that, if there were machinations in the 
market-place, they were in part instigated by Jacobins in order 
to increase suffering and foment revolution.  In  short, 
Waddington, if he had not actually manipulated the market with 
 
142 Summary of the Trial, 66 n. 
143 Ibid., 52-9; see Hay, 'Contempt by Scandalizing the Court', 476. 
144 Townshend, Lives of Twelve Eminent Judges, 59ff.; Proceedings in the Cause the 
King  v.  Waddington, 6. 
145 Mary, Lady Kenyon to her sisters, 29 Nov. (1800]: Kenyon MSS, no.  1429; this 
part of the letter is not printed in HM C Kenyon, 558. She meant that sentence had 
been delayed (until 28 January 1801); judgement was given 28 November 1800. See 
also Proceedings in the Cause the King v. Waddington, 6-7; Times, 29 Nov. 1800. 
146 He wrote home from Maidstone, while on circuit in July 1801: 'The hops and 
corn promise most extremely well indeed. They say hops will be very cheap, and 
that the speculators will suffer much. It is said a dealer in this town will lose by his 
monopolising scheme from twenty thousand to forty thousand pounds. Waddington, 
I understand, is very unpopular now, and likely to feel very reduced circumstances': 
Kenyon, Lzfe of Kenyon, 386-7. 
147 Proceedings in the Cause the King v. Waddington, 4, 11. 
  
the intention of fomenting revolution, was the kind of man the 
judges were sure would exult in such an outcome. 148 
The belief was plausible. The marketing cases were conten- 
tious, contradictory in their effects and the interpretations they 
provoked, precisely because they encapsulated a critical moment 
in the history of classical political economy and also in popular 
economic beliefs. Not only was there widespread disagreement 
among country gentlemen and the highest judges and the govern- 
ment as to the merits of Adam Smith versus ancient law; there 
were also strong cross-currents in popular opinion. Food rioters 
throughout the land stood with Lord Kenyon, but many Jacobins, 
including not only Waddington but also Thomas Paine himself, 
were persuaded that free markets, in the cloth halls of the north- 
ern textile industry, in some labour markets and even in food- 
stuffs, were ineluctably part of individual freedom, the freedom 
from aristocratic government. By 1779, during his time in 
Philadelphia, Paine had come to oppose market controls. 149 
Waddington and many other radicals, including Cobbett, believed 
or claimed that the prosecution had in fact been instigated by 
'Pitt's myrmidons' in order  to punish Waddington for his poli- 
tics.150 Given Pitt's opposition to the old laws, this seems highly 
unlikely, however much he liked to gaol Jacobins: Waddington's 
conviction apparently created a precedent that sustained a theory 
of markets that Pitt deplored. Believing that he had been con- 
victed of an offence abolished by parliament in 1772, Waddington 
tore up a copy of the statute in the court, exclaiming, 'most 
disgraceful! most disgraceful!' 151 The irony is that the prime minis- 
ter and most of the government agreed with him. 
On his release from King's Bench prison, where he had spent 
twenty-seven  weeks,  he  was given  a hero's  welcome  in Kent. 
 
148 This belief was reported from Lichfield by Richard George Robinson to 
Liverpool in the autumn of 1800: Brit. Lib., Add. MSS 38,234, fo. 170. See also Aris' 
Birmingham  Gaz., 28 July  1800, reprinting  from the London  Packet. 
149 Eric Foner, Tom Paine and Revolutionary America (London, 1976), ch.  5. 
Bentham remarked with respect to 'interference of government': 'I leave it to Adam 
Smith, and the champions of the rights of man . . . to talk of invasions of natural 
liberty', quoted in Atiyah, Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract, 326. 
150 W. T. Sherwin, Memoirs of the Life of Thomas Paine (London, 1819), 132-5; 
William Cobbett, American Register (Arlington, 1816), 329, has an account of the 
trial; see also his Rural Rides, ed. George Woodcock (Harmondsworth,  1967), 179; 
'S. F. Waddington to Lord Chief Justice Abbott, 12 Jan. 1825', Republican, 21 Jan. 
1825. I owe the last reference to James Epstein. 
151 Bell's  Weekly Messenger,  1 Feb.  1801. 
  
First came a celebratory feast at Tunbridge Wells. Hop planters 
then took the horses from his carriage 'covered with wreaths of 
hopbine', and drew  him by relays  of men the twelve miles to 
Maidstone. He made a triumphal speech to cries of 'Waddington 
and the freedom of commerce', and a subscription was begun on 
his behalf. 152 But despite this his legal costs appear to  have 
ruined  him. 153 
Grose and Kenyon had repeatedly urged the  importance  of 
such a precedent as they now appeared to have. Yet the policy 
argument of supplying London was not a trivial  one. The old 
laws might make some sense in local markets, but the corn 
exchange and Smithfield were ramified with practices that 
threatened to expose hundreds of traders to prosecutions and, 
indeed, convictions, especially for regrating. It was at this point, 
when Kenyon was coming under very strong criticism from 
within government and a significant part of public opinion, that 
Law and the other counsel still defending Rushy elaborated the 
newly minted argument that regrating -the crucial question in 
the corn and meat markets of London -could not, by the most 
exhaustive examination of the ancient statutes and cases, be shown 
to have been an offence before the statute of 5 & 6 Edward VI. 
It had been repealed; the offence therefore no longer existed. 154 
On  31  January  the  court  granted  a  rule  to  show  cause  why 
 
152 Turberville,  Worcestershire in the Nineteenth  Century,  112. 
153 In his 1811 petition to the prince of Wales he described his ruin: to support his 
family (he was married with eight  children) he had  to depend on  'the benefactions 
of intelligent and philanthropic people'.  He petitioned  for a position  in the customs 
or elsewhere; he was refused a year later. In 1812 he appealed to Liverpool, and also 
wrote to Eldon and Ellenborough (who, as his counsel in 1800, had played a part in 
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the prince again in July 1814, reminding him of his wrongful conviction for diverting 
money from 'the harpy fangs of intermediate agents . . . into the hands of the 
industrious cultivators of the soil'. He proceeded to enveigh against the predominance 
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42/116, fos. 144-5, petition of Samuel Ferrand Waddington to the Prince Regent, 
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step in consequence of it', 12 Aug. 1812; Waddington to Liverpool, 11 June 1812: 
Brit. Lib., Add.  MSS 38,248, fo. 20; also R.  Willmott's  draft reply  to Waddington 
of 26  June 1812: 'Lord L acknowledged receipt, informs you that he is wholly 
unacquainted with the circumstances of your case, has referred letter to the Home 
Department': Brit. Lib., Add. MSS,  38,248,  fo.  126; Brit.  Lib., Add.  MSS  38,258, 
fo.  198, petition of Waddington  to the Prince Regent, 21 July  1814. 
154 For a summary of counsel's arguments, see Joseph Chitty, A Practical Treatise 
of Criminal Law, 4 vols. (London,  1816), ii, 536-7, n. r. 
  
judgement should not be arrested, and, following the arguments 
of counsel, the judges were divided. 
This inconclusive outcome on regrating, and Waddington's 
convictions for forestalling and engrossing in November 1800 and 
February 1801, marked the end of Kenyon's campaign. In the 
event, no judgement was ever given in Rusby's case: the prosecu- 
tion was absolutely discharged a few years later. A few other 
cases that had been progressing through the labyrinthine proced- 
ures of King's Bench resulted in acquittals in 1801, or were 
dropped. 155 The common law had triumphed through its ambigu- 
ity. A Jacobin engrosser had been publicly and severely punished; 
the justice of the law's interference with commerce had been 
vindicated. But, with the sudden discovery by the judges that 
regrating no longer existed as an offence, the pressing practical 
danger to the London markets had been adroitly avoided. Lord 
Holland, who attributed Kenyon's hostility to middlemen to 
ignorance, concluded that in the end, the Lord  Chief  Justice 
rather ignobly capitulated to the Ministry. 156 It seems more likely 
that, when he died in 1802, Kenyon, if not his brothers on the 
bench, still believed  that he was right to enforce the marketing 
laws, and probably hopeful that the new precedent in Waddington 
would curb the evil for the foreseeable future. 
 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
Kenyon was not to know that his successor as Lord Chief Justice 
was to be Edward Law, now Lord Ellenborough, who as 
Waddington's counsel had lectured his predecessor on the wisdom 
of the market. 157 Ellenborough displayed his ideological commit- 
ment to Smithian economics in a number of ways. 158 He doubtless 
also believed the two public-order arguments that had discredited 
 
155 Edward Edwards, the prosecutor in three of them (removed by certiorari from 
Essex and Middlesex), was himself successfully prosecuted for an offence in Kent 
(Appendix ). 
156 Holland, Memoirs  of  the  Whig Party, i, 167-9. 
157 Of  which his father, Dr Edmund Law, Master of Peterhouse at mid-century, 
had not heard: 'Last week I called a meeting of the heads, who heartily concurred in 
endeavouring to break a combination of ingrossers and forestallers that had almost 
ruined our market ': see letter by Law to an unspecified Lord, 20 Jan. 1756:  Brit. 
Lib., Add.  MSS 32,862, fo.  163. 
158 I deal with this in forthcoming work. 
  
Kenyon's stand. If the old laws were enforced, the middlemen 
upon whom the supply of large urban markets, especially London, 
depended, could not trade, and the supply of food would be 
greatly disrupted, with all the dangers of riot that that entailed 
for the early modern state. The second danger lay in the fact that 
Kenyon's analysis of the mood of the people was wrong: far from 
reassuring them  that  the authorities  were  acting, denunciations 
of middlemen from the bench encouraged the mob to riot. Rusby's 
house had been destroyed shortly after he had been declared a 
social parasite by one of Kenyon's juries; the largest food riots in 
the capital in a century had followed Kenyon's second conviction 
of Waddington. More fundamentally, by 1802 the balance of 
persuasion and coercion in the maintenance of public order had 
changed in England, during the very months when Waddington 
and Rushy were being prosecuted. There had been a massive 
reinforcement of military power in England itself, as Pitt con- 
structed barracks and thousands of troops were poured into the 
Midlands and other parts of the country. 
In short, Kenyon's theory of social pacification through invoca- 
tion of the law was rapidly becoming irrelevant, at least in terms 
of marketing. As one respected contemporary  put  it, 'doctrines 
of most  serious tendency had been propagated from the bench, 
the bar,  the hustings and the press, directly, although uninten- 
tionally, countenancing the popular passions and prejudices', 
which incited the mob to acts of violence. 'What has saved us 
lately, from conflagrations and massacres, but the country 
happening to be in  a  state  of  armed  preparation?' 159  Kenyon 
and his brother judges had blundered into inflaming the mob. 
Denouncing forestallers from the throne or the bench had always 
been a calculated risk, and the purpose, calming anxiety about 
the markets in order to prevent riot, was now becoming irrelevant 
as Britain became an armed camp. 
But Law, who as counsel for Waddington and for Rushy had 
urged such arguments, and had also given Kenyon a seminar in 
the Smithian market model, was by April 1802 Lord Chief Justice, 
the guardian of the common law. Part of that law now was 
Waddington's Case, an unequivocal and recent precedent. Or was 
it? What was Ellenborough's  attitude as a judge, rather than as 
an advocate for a client? 
159 [Sir Gilbert Blane], Inquiry into the Causes and Remedies of the Late and Present 
Scarcity,  (London,  1800). 
  
At the time of Rusby and Waddington's cases, at least seven 
other marketing prosecutions were under way in King's Bench. 
But, as the price-crisis eased, most were dropped, resulted in 
acquittals before juries or were found insufficient in law. One, 
the prosecution of a Camarthen miller for engrossing very large 
quantities of grain, was due to go before a jury in March 1802, 
but Kenyon was ill (he died in April). The case never came 
to trial. 160 
Waddington, while still in prison early in 1801, tried to sue for 
monies that he had advanced to a hop-grower on the value of his 
crop, which had never been delivered to him, on a contract of 
1799. He was nonsuited at spring assizes in Kent, on the grounds 
that the written agreement had not been stamped, and the nonsuit 
was confirmed in the court of Common Pleas. The few comments 
of the judges suggest, however, that new arguments were being 
rehearsed. Although Mr Justice Rooke used the fact that 
Waddington's contract was 'a speculative bargain' rather than 'an 
ordinary commercial transaction' to find against him, Mr Justice 
Chambre explicitly referred  to the legality of a contract for the 
sale of growing hops for future delivery. 161 
Once Ellenborough was on the bench it was evidently realized 
that no convictions could be had, or would stand re-examination, 
in King's Bench. In 1804, Rusby, who had been held to a recog- 
nizance until the disputed point of law on whether regrating was 
an offence had been determined, was given a final and free 
discharge. In 1806, Waddington sued the delinquent hop-grower 
(or rather his executors)  once more, this time in King's Bench, 
Ellenborough's court. There, Waddington got a verdict and 
judgement for £861 damages. The defendants appealed the judge- 
ment, having the case heard again on writ of error in Exchequer 
Chamber. Their defence there was explicitly based on the preced- 
ent Kenyon had created in Waddington's criminal convictions: 
that selling growing hops was the equivalent of forestalling and 
that the statute of 1772 had not taken away the common-law 
offences. The Chief Justice of Common Pleas, who headed the 
court, rejected  the argument  from analogy on several  grounds, 
160 See Appendix. 
161 The suit was against executors of a deceased hop-grower, who like him had 
failed to deliver all the hops on 22 acres which Waddington et al. had contracted in 
November 1799 to buy at £10 per cwt;  the  nonsuit was  on the ground that the 
unstamped agreement could not be entered in evidence: Waddington et al. v. Bristow 
et al., Executors of Simmons (9 June 1801), 2 Bosanquet & Puller 451; 126 ER  1379. 
 
 
 
 
  
and explicitly endorsed parliament's  will in 1772: 'After the 12 
Geo. 3 we should expect a precise determination in point to 
authorize us to hold such a contract against law'. 162 
The realization that Waddington was being set aside as a preced- 
ent can be partially traced in the justicing handbooks. The 1805 
edition of Bum's Justice of the Peace preceded a full account of 
Waddington's Case with the comment, 'indeed lamentable would 
be the plight of the public and of the state, were there no remedy 
against practices which have been justly termed most heinous 
offences against religion and morality, and against the established 
law of the country'. 163 But the 1807 edition of Bacon's Abridgement 
ignored Waddington and, by the 1810 edition of Burn, the account 
of the case was considerably shortened. 164 
The decisive change, however, came with Joseph Chitty's treat- 
ment of the offences in 1816, in the first edition of his influential 
Practical Treatise on Criminal Law. In the absence of any further 
decided cases, it was impossible to be absolutely certain of the 
grounds on which King's Bench would dismiss prosecutions for 
forestalling, regrating and engrossing. But  Chitty's  conclusion 
was that the court would apply the tests of the criminal law in 
the most stringent way to such accusations. For an act to be a 
crime it had both to do harm and also be the product of knowing 
or evil intent ( mens rea) on the part of the actor. Waddington 
may have fit the latter if not the former requirement (there was 
evidence on his trial that he had tried to  organize growers to 
drive up prices), but Rushy was probably more typical, in that 
he was simply engaged in his usual practices of buying and 
reselling, an essential link in the complex nexus of wholesale and 
retail markets. It would be very hard to prove that such a man 
intended  to reap an unwarranted  profit.  But Chitty's interpreta- 
162 Bristow and Others, Executors of Henry Simmonds v. Waddington and Others, in 
Error, 20 Nov. 1806, 2 Bosanquet & Puller (N. R.) 355; 127 ER  664. Exchequer 
Chamber, which heard cases appealed from King's Bench, consisted of the judges of 
the other common-law courts. Waddington cited this decision in his petitions to the 
Prince Regent. 
163 Richard Burn, The Justice of the Peace and Parish Officer, 20th edn, 4 vols. 
(London, 1805), ii, 358 (also in the 1814 edn). It provided  forms of indictments for 
each offence at common law, as did Thomas Walter Williams, The Whole Law Relative 
to the Duty and Office of a Justice of the Peace, 2nd edn, 4 vols. (London, 1808), ii, 
503-7, which also noted some unrepealed statutes. Neither cite Rusby on regrating 
and both say that all three offences remain punishable at common law. 
164 Matthew Bacon, A New Abridgement of the Law, 7 vols., 6th edn (London, 1807), 
iii, 261; see Hay, 'Moral Economy, Political Economy, and Law', for Bacon's treat- 
ment of the offence in earlier editions. 
  
tion of the probable state of the law also pointed to the doubts 
about what Kenyon had  simply assumed:  that  engrossing,  and 
the other penalized acts, actually harmed anyone. Two cases in 
particular were used by Ellenborough from the bench to show 
that the reverse was in fact the case. The first, R. v. Webb et al. 
(1811), was a prosecution against the partners of the Birmingham 
Flour and Bread Company under the Bubble Act. Ellenborough 
endorsed the finding of the jury that a company that bought very 
large quantities of grain for the purpose of regularly supplying 
Birmingham with bread and flour had a purpose 'not manifestly 
tending to the common grievance', but one 'expressly found to 
have been beneficial'. 165 In the following year, in Pratt v. 
Hutchinson (1812), the issue of whether a company purpose was 
beneficial was again raised, and the example in Webb again relied 
upon. The year was a significant one, for prices were higher than 
at any time since 1801 and there was widespread suffering and, 
in many parts of the country, again near-insurrection. In these 
circumstances, Ellenborough did not reactivate the common-law 
offences; rather the reverse. 166 
Although in both of these cases it was a jury that had made 
the determination, Chitty concluded in 1816: 
at the present day, it would probably be holden that no offence is commit- 
ted unless there is an intent to raise the price of provisions by the conduct 
of the party. For the mere transfer of a purchase in the market where it 
is made, the buying articles before they arrive at a public market, or the 
purchasing of a large quantity of a particular article, can scarcely be 
regarded as in themselves necessarily injurious to the community . . . the 
division of labour or occupations will in general occasion the commodity to 
be sold cheaper to the consumer. 167 
The reference to Smith is clear. Forestalling and perhaps regrating 
continued to be attacked under local market regulations for some 
years, but the common-law offences were dead. 
They had a short afterlife in the manuals of justices of  the 
peace. In the 1820 edition of Burn, the encomium of the common 
law quoted above was retained, but Chitty's strong endorsement 
of  Law's  arguments  was  also  quoted  at  length,  complete  with 
 
165 R. v. Webb (1811) 14 East 406 (104 ER 658), at 421. The Company was said to 
be a direct response to the dearth and high prices of 1795-6: see 14 East 409. 
166 I discuss these cases more fully elsewhere. 
167 My emphasis. Like Ellenborough when he argued before Lord Kenyon, Chitty 
cited Wealth of Nations, as well as Webb, and Pratt v. Hutchison: Chitty, Practical 
Treatise, ii, 528 n. h. 
  
references to The Wealth of Nations, and to Rusby. 168 Finally, in 
1837, the editor observed: 'This offence is now of rare occurrence, 
or, at all events, the offender is rarely, if ever, proceeded against; 
it is deemed, therefore, not necessary to insert any forms hereon'. 
In 1844, when parliament passed An Act for Abolishing the Offences 
of Forestalling, Regrating, and ingrossing . . . (7 & 8 Victoria, c. 
24), which formally abolished the offences at common law or by 
any statute and repealed a number of statutes earlier than those 
repealed in 1772, as well as Irish and Scottish statutes, there was 
not one word of debate. 
I have argued here that the successive phases of criminalization 
and decriminalization of the marketing offences can only be fully 
explained when such contingencies as the idiosyncrasies of Chief 
Justices and the short-term crises of harvest failure are taken into 
account. But the marketing cases are also significant markers of 
several fundamental processes in English society at the end of the 
eighteenth  century. 
The acts and politics of Waddington as a defendant throw into 
sharp relief the complicated and unresolved attitudes of wider 
public opinion to classical political economy before the end of 
the century. There were probably generational differences: 
Kenyon trained as a lawyer in the 1750s, when the marketing 
offences were accepted law (supported by Ellenborough's father, 
among others). 169 But even in 1800 the acceptance by the parlia- 
mentary leaders of Smith's conclusions was opposed by a disparate 
group of doubters. Evangelical  reformers  or sympathizers such 
as Glasse, Girdler and Kenyon himself levelled a moral critique 
against Smith. Traditionalist  magistrates and others who prided 
themselves on practical rather than theoretical knowledge 
(Liverpool, Banks, probably the King) distrusted him. Military 
officers often supported the old view for similar reasons: Erskine, 
who had served in both the navy and army, was an instance; and 
Warren Hastings advised close regulation of British markets in 
1801, based on his experience in India in 1783.170 But political 
and theoretical alignments were greatly complicated by the 
endorsement   of   Smith   by   Jacobins,   including   Waddington 
 
168 Unchanged in the 1825, 1830 and 1836 editions of Burn, Justice of the Peace and 
Parish Officer. 
169 Above, n. 157. 
170 Salim Rashid, 'The Policy of Laissez-Faire during Scarcities', Econ. JI,  xc 
(1980),  500-1. 
  
(who  dedicated  one  of  his  pamphlets  to  Pitt)  and  Tom  Paine 
himself. 
The fact that Waddington and Rushy were prosecuted  in such 
a glare of publicity  helped  to bring about fundamental change. 
The trials were a public seminar in market theory, in the details 
of  the  wholesale  trades,  in  the  issues  of  public  order.  Smith's 
critique had been directed at law, and these cases were the ulti- 
mate  test  of  the argument  that  courts could  beneficially  crim- 
inalize  certain  kinds  of  contracting.  The  failure  to  establish  a 
precedent   against  regrating   in  1801,  and  the  destruction  of 
Kenyon's precedent against engrossing by the new Chief Justice 
after  1802,  powerfully  endorsed  the  government's  support  of 
non-intervention.  (The most important politician of all who may 
have continued to doubt, George III, was no longer in a position 
to do so effectively after his final madness began in 1810.) The 
repudiation  of  Waddington as a  precedent  became  part  of  the 
interconnected arguments that increasingly justified a new theory 
of contract law, one attuned to the ideal of perfect markets rather 
than to those of morality, custom or 'police', in its old sense. 171 
These cases also call our attention to the immense change in 
the  nature  of  public-order  calculations  brought  about  by  the 
Revolutionary war. One of the oldest policy consideration behind 
the marketing  laws, preventing  disorder  by protecting  the con- 
sumer, was suddenly  outmoded,  not  only  by  the doubts about 
the effects of the laws, but also because the massive armed force 
created  in the course of the war  with Revolutionary  France, a 
large part  of which was now garrisoned  on the British public, 
made it possible to weaken the regulatory state by strengthening 
the policing state. Troops allowed the political elite to believe in 
the practical possibility of free markets, as well as their theoretical 
desirability. 
Finally, the cases delineate some of the contours of the constitu- 
tional independence and political influence of the judiciary in this 
period. Kenyon attended some cabinet councils, but did not sit 
there as Mansfield had done continuously for some years, and 
Ellenborough was to do for some months. None the less, like all 
of the great eighteenth-century judges, he was a powerful political 
figure when he wished to be. Often such influence was out of the 
 
171 Atiyah, Rise and Fall of Freedom of Contract; Douglas Hay and Nicholas Rogers, 
English Society in the Eighteenth Century: Shuttles and Swords (Oxford, 1997), chs. 5-9. 
  
public eye: advising on the Regency Crisis of 1788; questioning 
political prisoners before the Privy Council; commenting on pro- 
posed legislation. But the marketing cases are a reminder -one 
of many -of how large issues of public policy, hotly contested, 
were in fact debated in the courts rather than in parliament, and 
how important the influence  of a powerful judge could be on 
such debates, in directing verdicts, giving judgement and making 
comments obiter. The most important common-law judges were 
as much statesmen as was the Lord Chancellor, and the role was 
expected of them. 172 After 1701, they were statesmen independent 
of the administration when they wished to be. 
Ellenborough's endorsement of Smith was not followed imme- 
diately everywhere in the common-law world. 173 There was inde- 
pendent Irish legislation of 1738 and 1746 punishing forestalling 
and engrossing and neither it nor ancient statutes was affected 
by the 1772 English repeal. 174 As in England, there was probably 
confusion about what the new political economy meant. Sir 
Richard Aston, in a charge to a Dublin jury in 1763, referred to 
both the price mechanism and to the old laws with approval. 175 
Moreover, traditionalists were still dominant in the Irish legislat- 
ure. In 1774, a statute was passed that empowered any three of 
the market jury of the City of Dublin to visit markets and 
storehouses and shops, and to seize and condemn any provisions 
'in the hands of forestallers, regrators, or ingrossers'; similar 
powers  were extended  to other parts of Dublin by a statute of 
1787.176 In September 1800, the Recorder of Dublin charged the 
grand jury to present forestalling: 'A crime of such magnitude 
ought, at all times, to be narrowly watched, and rigorously pun- 
 
 
172 I make this argument in a book in progress, The Judges and the People: King's 
Bench and the Criminal Law in English Politics and Society, 1750-1820 (forthcoming). 
173 In Scotland, not a common-law jurisdiction, forestalling was an offence consid- 
ered of such public importance (or delicacy) that prosecution was reserved for the 
Lord Advocate, so that government policy rather than the wishes of private prosecu- 
tors was decisive: Douglas Hay and F. Snyder, 'Using the Criminal Law, 1750-1850: 
Policing, Private Prosecution, and the State', in Douglas Hay and F. Snyder (eds.), 
Policing and Prosecution in Britain, 1750-1850 (Oxford, 1989), 29. See also J. Erskine, 
An  Institute  of the Law  of Scotland  (Edinburgh,  1773), 765-6. 
174 11 Geo. II, c. 11 (1738);  19 Geo. II, c. 17 (1746), cited in Sir Richard Bolton, 
A Justice of Peace for  Ireland, ed. Michael Travers (Dublin,  1750), 269-70. 
175  Charges to the Grand Jury, ed. Lamoine, 405. 
176 13 & 14 Geo. III, c. 22, s.73 (1774); 27 Geo. III, c. 46, s. 3 (1787); both were 
repealed in 1844. 
  
ished'. 177 The statutes continued to be cited in the standard Irish 
justices' handbook into the nineteenth century. 178 
In the British North American colonies, perhaps especially 
those with governments strongly influenced by military officers 
of a traditional cast of mind, the wisdom of closely regulating 
markets in foodstuffs was widespread. The rejection of such 
legislation in Philadelphia during the American Revolution has 
been mentioned. Ordinances of Quebec in 1777 and 1780 con- 
tinued the market regulation common under the French regime 
before 1760 and in the earlier period of British rule, defining and 
setting penalties on forestallers, regrators and engrossers. 179 In 
Nova Scotia, in British hands from 1713, there was legislation 
against forestallers and engrossers enacted in  1758, 1766, 1778 
and 1798, for food, hay, provisions and wood. From 1826, the 
statutes were suspended repeatedly; they were repealed in 
1847.180 
These were colonies of British, or at least, European settlement. 
In India and the rest of the non-white Empire, new economic 
theory favoured at the highest level could be expressed as policy 
and law much more quickly, particularly with lecturers like 
Thomas Malthus at Haileybury. The governor of Bombay inter- 
vened actively during the famine of 1802-4, but by the time of 
the Madras famine of 1806-7 policy was divided, with copious 
references to Smith used to justify non-intervention. Henceforth, 
famine in India largely was left to the mercies of the invisible 
hand.181 
The strength of the belief in theory is clear in the English case 
and the abrogation of the marketing laws was, in many ways, a 
crucial step in its advance. Supplying the consumer by  direct 
state intervention was one of the oldest  and  most  developed 
parts of the Tudor/Stuart regulatory state inherited by the 
Hanoverians, even if in a decayed form. The issue of starvation 
was the ultimate test of a commitment to political economy. Many 
177 Quoted in Girdler, Observations on Forestalling, 314. 
178 Leonard MacNally, The Justice of the Peace for Ireland, 2 vols. (Dublin, 1808), 
i, 676-7. 
179 Quebec 17 Geo. III, c. 4 (1777); 20 Geo. III, c. 2 (1780), in Arthur G. Doughty, 
Report of the Work of the Public Archives for the Years 1914 and 1915 (Ottawa, 1916; 
sessional paper 29a of 1916), 60-2, 103-10. 
180 32 Geo. II, c. 10 (NS); 6 Geo. III, c. 6 (NS); 17 Geo. III, c. 5 (NS); 38 Geo. III, 
c. 4 (NS); SNS 1826, c. 20; SNS 1847, c. 66. I owe these references to Philip Girard. 
181 Rashid, 'Policy of Laissez-Faire during Scarcities', 500-1; S. Ambirajan, Classical 
Political  Economy  and  British  Policy  in India  (Cambridge,  1978), chs.  1, 3. 
  
economists on the Continent, theorizers of the free market, had 
indeed drawn back in the 1770s from the extreme conclusion that 
food markets were like other markets; in England, perhaps 
because more of the population was above the line of subsistence, 
they did not. 182 In 1801, faced with a far greater crisis, the English 
judiciary (but not the government) also refused to abandon the 
moral supervision of markets. But once that crisis had passed, 
the political validation of Smithian economics was massively 
advanced in England, and its empire. 
 
York  University, Toronto Douglas Hay 
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APPENDIX 
 
MARKETING  PROSECUTIONS  IN KING'S  BENCH  1799-1801* 
28 Nov. 1799, John Rushy, yeoman ( certiorari by prosecutor Richard  Snell, 
from London City Quarter Sessions, for engrossing 90 quarters of oats at the 
Corn Exchange, and another indictment for regrating 30 quarters ): for details, 
see text. Sources: KB 10/51, pt 1, Hilary 40 Geo. III, nos. 4, 5; KB 15/6, 
Hilary 40 Geo. III; KB  15117, Easter and Trinity 40 Geo. III; KB 21147, 
350, 357, 362, 373, 409, 411, 433, 438; KB 21148, 337. 
 
22 Jan. 1800, S. F. Waddington ( criminal information of 10 counts for engrossing 
a large quantity of hops and making forehand bargains with intent to raise the 
price, persuading persons not to carry hops to market, at M aidstone, Kent): for 
details, see text. Sources: KB 11161, pt 1, Easter 1800, no. 2; KB 15/6, 
Trinity 40 Geo. III; KB 15117, Michaelmas 41 Geo. III; KB 21/47, 344, 358, 
395,  403,  436,  444,  454,  458,  467;  KB  1130, Hilary  1800, affidavits  of 
Thomas Knipe, Edward Meredith, William Richmond (2), Thomas  Ellis, 
Peter Broadley et al.; also Trinity 1800, affidavits of William Richmond, 
Samuel F. Waddington. 
 
29 M ar. 1800, S. F. Waddington ( criminal information of 8 counts for spreading 
and raising false rumours to enhance the price of hops, persuading dealers not to 
bring hops to market, engrossing hops, at Worcester): for details, see text. 
Sources: KB 11161, pt 2, Trinity 1800 no.  1; KB 15/6, Trinity 40 Geo. III, 
10 July 1800; KB 15/17, Trinity 40 Geo. III; KB 21147, 344, 358, 369, 376, 
396, 427, 439, 451; KB 1130, Easter 1800, affidavit of William Penn. 
 
15 Sept. 1800, Richard Laycock, yeoman ( certiorari by prosecutor, Edward 
Edwards, M ddx., for forestalling Smithfield of cows and  calves):  offence  13 
Mar. 1800; indicted 15 Sept. 1800; 1 Dec. 1800 certiorari allowed; leave to 
imparl, pleads not guilty Hilary 41 Geo. III. Sources: KB 10/51, pt 2, 
Michaelmas 1800; KB 15/6, Michaelmas 41 Geo. III; KB 21/47, 435. 
  
7 Oct. 1800, Yeats ( certiorari by prosecutor, Edward Edwards, from Chelmsford, 
Essex Quarter Sessions, forestalling lambs at Rumford market): offence 1 Sept. 
1800; indicted 7 Oct.  1800; certiorari allowed 7 Nov.  1800. Sources: KB 
11161, pt 1, Michaelmas 1801, no. 25; KB 21/47, 411. 
 
8 Oct. 1800, Richard M ansel Philipps Esq.  ( certiorari  by  prosecutor,  John 
Davies, gent., from   Carmarthen  Quarter  Sessions, for   engrossing  4,000  quarters 
of wheat, 6,000  quarters of barley, 3,000 lb of cheese, 6,000 quarters of oats): 
offence 1 Mar. 1800; presented 8 Oct. 1800; certiorari 22 Oct.; leave to 
imparl Michaelmas 41 Geo. III; 23 Jan. 1801 order to plead; 27 Jan. order 
to plead; 31 Jan. order to plead; order for trial 4 Feb. 1802; 12 Feb. order 
for special jury at instance of defendant; order for trial countermanded 11 
Mar. 1802. Sources: KB 11/61, pt 1, Michaelmas 1800, no. 28; KB  15/6, 
Michaelmas 41 Geo. III; KB 15/17, Hilary 42 Geo. III; KB 21/47, 444, 449, 
454, 630. 
 
8 Oct. 1800, Joseph  Wood, brewer ( certiorari by defendant, from  Newcastle  on 
Tyne Quarter Sessions, for enhancing price of barley): offence 27 Sept. 1800; 
indicted 8 Oct. 1800; certiorari 12 Feb. 1801; leave to imparl Easter 41 Geo. 
III; 25 June order for a jury of Northumberland at instance of defendant; 
notice of trial 21 July 1801; 6 Nov. rule nisi for judgement for defendant. 
Sources: KB 11161, pt 3, Easter 1801, no. 39; KB 15/6, Easter 41 Geo. III; 
KB 15/17, 21 July 1801; KB 21/47, 542, 546. 
 
13 Jan. 1801, Samuel Quarrel,  butcher  ( certiorari  by  prosecutor,  William 
Brundell, Essex Quarter Sessions, forestalling lambs): offence 1 Sept. 1800; 
indictment  13 Jan.  1801; certiorari 12 Feb.  1801. Sources: KB 11/61, pt 3, 
Easter 1801, no. 30. 
 
13 Jan. 1801, Samuel M athers, butcher ( certiorari  by  prosecutor,  Edward 
Edwards, Chelmsford, Essex for forestalling lambs): offence 2 Sept. 1800; 
indicted  13 Jan.  1801; certiorari  12 Feb.  1801. Sources:  KB  11/61, pt  3, 
Easter 1801, no. 29. 
 
13 Jan. 1801,  Samuel  Judson,  butcher  ( certiorari  by  prosecutor,  William 
Brundell, Essex Quarter Sessions, for forestalling calves): offence 1 Sept. 1800; 
indicted 13 Jan.1801; certiorari 12 Feb. Sources: KB 11/61, pt 3, Easter 
1801, no. 28. 
 
16 Jan. 1801, WilliamJosceline, yeoman, prosecuted by John Cowper, gentleman, 
clerk of the peace for the borough ( certiorari by defendant, borough St. Albans, 
Herts., regrating 7 loads of wheat): offence 29 Nov. 1800; indictment 16 Jan. 
1801; certiorari 18 May 1801; leave to  imparl, Michaelmas  41  Geo.  III; 
23 June by consent of prosecutor, ordered that defendant may sign judge- 
ment for want of a joinder in demurrer. Sources: KB 11161, pt 2, Trinity 
1802, no. 17; KB 15/6, Trinity 41 Geo. III; KB 21147, 535, 536. 
 
18 Apr. 1801 John Gilbert ( certiorari by  defendant,  City of  Lincoln,  engrossing 
fish, geese, and duck s ): offence 24 Oct. 1800; indicted 18 Apr. 1801, traverses; 
certiorari 12 Feb. 1801; leave to imparl Easter 41 Geo. III; 8 June order for 
a concilium at instance of defendant; 17 June after hearing counsel  both 
sides, it is adjudged that the prosecution is insufficient in law, judgement 
for the defendant (the judgement was found bad on demurrer for not 
specifying quantities): R  v.  Gilbert, 1 Easter 582. Sources: KB 11/61, pt 3, 
  
Easter  1801 no. 36; KB 15/6, Easter 41 Geo. III; KB 21/47, 512, 525; KB 
21/48, 342. 
 
Jan. 1801 Edward Edwards (Kent) for regrating a cow at Farningham fair: 
Jan. 1801 indicted for regrating a cow at Farningham fair but not tried; 
imprisoned in Fleet as of June 1801; removed on habeas corpus to Kent; 
fined £50 and to be imprisoned 12 months, quarter sessions for Western 
Division of Kent, Aug. 1801. Sources: KB 1/3111, Trinity 41 Geo. III no. 1, 
no. 51, affidavit for habeas corpus to remove to Kent for trial; M anchester 
M ercury, 11 Aug. 1801. (The fact that Edwards appears as both a prosecutor 
and defendant in these cases suggests that he was  a common  informer, 
skilled in the use of the law. He is perhaps the Edward Edwards who applied 
for habeas corpus from Newgate in November 1791, after being arrested 
for not having  answered  to an indictment for theft in Wiltshire in 1786: 
PRO, KB 16/21/1.) 
* Sources: The manuscript records of the Court of King's Bench in the 
Public Record Office, London, consist of paper affidavits, many series of 
parchment rolls and files, and a variety of registers. To reconstruct a case 
it is usually necessary to use all or almost all of the series. Some of those on 
the crown side of the Court are KB 1 (for the affidavits); KB 10 (London 
and Middlesex criminal informations); KB 11 (out-county  informations); 
KB 15 (appearance and notice of trial books); KB 16 (returned writs); KB 
21 (rule or order books); KB 29 (controllment rolls). An explanation of the 
KB series is given in my Crown Side Cases in the Court of King's Bench 
(Staffs. Hist. Soc., forthcoming). 
